

Promoting National Identity through Wartime Service Provision?

Evidence from Aceh, Indonesia

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Abstract: In civil war, state actors provide public services to civilians to win their “hearts and minds.” Wartime public service provision should help the state obtain popular support and expand the pro-state population because of the civilian demand for development and order in the locality. However, the provision of certain types of public services can be counterproductive in a context where rebels are struggling for separation. Examining novel survey data collected in Aceh, Indonesia, we find that civilians’ wartime experiences of receiving state-led education and security services significantly diminished their sense of belonging to the state in the post-war period, although these negative effects can be alleviated if civilians receive a substantial number of additional meaningful services. The wartime provision of public services is not always perceived as positive by the recipients and may give the impression that the state is exercising coercive power over civilians in peripheral regions.

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Introduction

Why do some patterns of the state-led wartime public service provision strengthen post-war national identity among civilians while others do not? There is a common understanding that through the successful delivery of public services, the state can win the “hearts and minds” of the locals and gain an advantage in military confrontations with the rebels. Achieving development and order, which are major concerns, should help the state obtain popular support and consequently expand the pro-state population. However, at the local level, the provision of certain types of public services can be counterproductive in enhancing an atmosphere that is friendly to the state. In a civil war where the rebels are struggling for separation, the presence of state actors can be perceived by the locals as coercive interference in their society. This article explores the effect of state-led wartime provision of public services on the national identity of civilians in the post-war context. We argue that civilians’ experience of state-led education and security services diminishes their sense of belonging to the state. However, these negative effects are alleviated by the provision of additional services, and civilians’ perceptions can even turn positive when they receive a substantial number of meaningful services.

These arguments are tested against wartime public service provision data and data regarding civilians’ attitudes toward the state in post-civil war Aceh, Indonesia. The Acehese Civil War (1976–2005) is a desirable case to examine the effects of state-led public services on the national identity of civilians because the Indonesian state put forth great effort to provide such services to the Acehese people as well as carry out military operations against separatist rebels.

During the civil war, the North Coast region (Aceh Utara, Bireuen, and Pidie) experienced intense violence because it was where the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) consolidated its command structure, and the state concentrated its counterinsurgency efforts. Yet, civilians did suffer from wartime violence on the East Coast (Aceh Tamiang and Aceh Timur) and Southwest Coast (Aceh Barat, Aceh Barat Daya, Aceh Selatan, and Nagan Raya) as well. In many of those areas, local institutions were encroached upon by the military when the communities were recognized as material bases for rebellion (Good et al. 2007).¹ The GAM had come

to control many Aceh villages by the middle of the war and established some governance institutions for taxation, economic regulation, and civil affairs management (McGibbon 2004, 15; Miller 2009, 81; Schulze 2004, 35). However, the GAM's influence weakened toward the latter phases of the war and came to an end when the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 made the government and GAM return to the negotiation table in 2004–5. With this shift in the situation, military and police posts were established in every village in the large areas of Aceh (Nessen 2006, 194).

The state's counterinsurgency is believed to have helped the locals form a sense of Acehnese ethnic identity against Indonesia. This was made possible, in particular, when GAM leaders took advantage of the state's violence to encourage a unique identity among civilians (Aspinall 2009).² For its counterinsurgency strategy, the state often attempted to combine direct force with non-military services. Previous studies point out that the local governments were unable or even unwilling to respond to the needs of the Acehnese.³ Exploiting the local disorder as a pretext for non-delivery of public services, they did not implement programs of effective development and governance but instead allowed corruption and mismanagement of the provincial budget to prevail (McGibbon 2006, 340; Miller 2009, 106). However, whether the state's wartime public services truly had no effect whatsoever on national identity remains empirically unexamined. The framework that equates the state's counterinsurgency efforts with the reception of public services by the locals allows us to examine the impact of the relevant services provided during the war. It is unlikely that, during wartime, state actors were seriously concerned about the post-war national identity of the Aceh people. Once the conflict was settled, however, this issue became a top priority for them because national integration could only be achieved in conjunction with the former rebel group and the civilians around it. Assuming that post-conflict nation-building is influenced by variations in wartime service provision, this article seeks to understand its long-term impact on civilian identity. Previous studies reveal the relationship between wartime service provision and citizen support for the incumbent government (e.g., Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Böhnke, Koehler, and Zürcher 2017; Böhnke and Zürcher 2013), but this can be an unreliable measure as civilians' attitude tends to fluctuate across administrations. In contrast, national identity is a long-lasting attachment

of people to state entities. While our empirical data may not capture the short-term effects of wartime experiences on the political attitudes of civilians, such data are suitable to capture changes that persist for the long term (see Dyrstad 2012).

This study's propensity-score analysis of novel survey data reveals that civilians' reception of wartime education and security services reduced their psychological closeness to the state, yet the negative effects of these services disappear when they are provided along with other ones such as welfare, infrastructure, and livelihood support in non-agriculture activities. Furthermore, the effects turn positive if civilians are provided with more types of services (e.g., livelihood support in agriculture). Recipients of a substantial number of additional meaningful services come to identify themselves as important stakeholders in their states' projects.

Public Services, Security, and "Hearts and Minds"

The importance of gaining popular support is often reflected in counterinsurgency doctrines that insist on effectively combining accommodative measures and military operations (e.g., U.S. Army 2007). This focus on "human factors" has been repeatedly emphasized by the literature on counterinsurgency as well (e.g., Berman and Matanock 2015; Cassidy 2008; Clutterbuck 1966; Kitson 1977; Leites and Wolf 1970; McMaster 2008; Taber 1965; Thompson 1966). Military actors often provide public services not only to increase the civilian population's access to basic services but also to win the "hearts and minds" of the locals (Böhnke and Zürcher 2013). This strategy is employed to reduce the demand for rebellion. As long as the state secures the population's welfare and addresses its grievances, it is expected that the locals will reciprocate by rewarding it with their support (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985).

Some previous studies provide empirical evidence on the reductive effect of service provision upon rebel-initiated violence. War-affected communities tend to cooperate with the state when the benefits of receiving public services overcome the cost of opposing the rebels (Berman et al. 2011; Berman and Laitin 2008; Berman, Shapiro, and

Felter 2011; Blaydes 2014; Chou 2012; Fetzer 2014; Grynkewich 2008; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013). Allowing the government to effectively contain rebellion, shared local information tends to lower the intensity of violence caused by rebels. Other studies simultaneously offer contrary findings. Examining the Philippines case, Crost, Felter, and Johnston (2014) found that service provision in development programs deteriorates security situations. Sexton (2016) also found that wartime aid by pro-government agents increases rebel violence when it is distributed to areas contested by the government and rebel forces.

By looking at the psychological foundation of violent incidents, this article aims to provide additional evidence to the debate on the effectiveness of wartime service provision by the state. While the level of rebel violence is contingent on civilians' attitudes toward state actors, empirical studies have paid scant attention to the public's perception of those actors.⁴ One of the difficulties in capturing individuals' attitudes toward political agents is that the physical presence of armed actors makes doing so redundant. Although the provision of primary services would facilitate collaboration and information flow from civilians by signaling the provider's capacity and commitment to governance, popular support may be less meaningful in areas where the government's clout is weak; rebel control hinders the government from acting on information even if it has local intelligence (Kalyvas 2006). This suggests that service provision needs to be accompanied by territorial control so that it can be effective enough to win support from the locals (Morgan 2016, 8). The seizure of territorial control makes popular support more relevant in that the level of support will be automatically linked to actual collaboration with the government.⁵

The literature provides mixed findings on the effect of certain types of public services on civilians' perspectives of political actors. For instance, the provision of security is considered to enhance the legitimacy of the service providers (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2013; Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013; Stollenwerk 2018). Individuals may support the actors who have been maintaining order or are expected to win the conflict to do so (Leites and Wolf 1970; Mikulaschek, Pant, and Tesfaye 2020; World Bank 2011). However, Morgan (2016) argues that popular support for the state declines as the presence of government forces increases during wartime. The

incumbent's interaction with the civilian population, which is often through its military and police, impairs the support base for the state (Matanock and García-Sánchez 2018).

Given that the effect of the wartime provision of public services on civilians' view of the state has been debated in the relevant literature, this article pays close attention to patterns of individuals' service reception to explore the levels of post-war national identification. The impact of service reception on national identification should be contingent on the level of pro-/anti-state sentiment. Pro-state civilians may enhance their support for the incumbent with an increase in services, but anti-state individuals may strengthen their negative views. In this sense, the service-support link should be examined with regard to individuals' identification and wartime experiences.

Service Reception and National Identity in Ethno-Separatist Civil War

Theory

National attitude tends to be polarized among civilians in a conflict where ethno-separatist rebels challenge the state entity. The state's clout is often limited, and its legitimacy is not fully recognized by the local population in the areas from which the rebels originate. In such a context, while some residents view the state as a legitimate ruler, others consider it an outside interlocutor in local affairs. This is often the case, especially when the state meddles in issues such as ethnic culture and local order. First, ethnic cultures tend to be tied to particular locations in this civil-war context. These cultures remain distinctive if the locals were historically segregated and did not frequently interact with those in other areas. More importantly, inter-cultural confrontation may be intensified by an armed struggle by rebels against the state. In this situation, the state's involvement in the cultural affairs of the locality is viewed as the imposition of central authority. Education is a typical example of this phenomenon because school curricula are often culturally oriented and rooted in the history and languages of the locality. After Aceh's autonomy laws were passed in 1999, the provincial government became authorized to introduce religious materials to the public education curriculum and

system. However, the national education system still oversaw regional educational affairs (Miller 2006; 2009).

Second, although the state often posts security forces for the purpose of putting down insurrections, their operations may involve civilians who are difficult to distinguish from guerrillas. In this situation, the presence of security forces may be taken by the locals as “evidence of the state’s repressive nature”; that is, it could seem to the locals that the state is not only disregarding their historical and cultural traditions but also denying them their own socio-political institutions (Morgan 2016). Augmenting the antagonism of locals against state actors, this process intensifies hostile relations between state actors and ethnic groups. Therefore, state-led public services that show off coercive power discourage civilians from identifying with the state.

This psychological mechanism can be enhanced when individuals have a strong ideational affinity for co-ethnic rebel actors. By emphasizing their role in protecting the locals, rebel leaders often describe the state as an outside enemy that intends to impose national laws and rules on the local society and remove indigenous institutions. Those who sympathize with such rebel propaganda are more likely to situate state-society relations on the axis of confrontation rather than cooperation.

The state may deliver public services to improve its relations with locals. Additional service provisions may alleviate any negative effect that its involvement in local culture and maintaining order could have on civilians’ attitudes toward the state. Services that relate to an increase in well-being tend to be the most effective because the civilian population may view the action as favorable treatment. In the context of counterinsurgency, which requires the state to deal with local culture and maintain order, one way for the state to implement such public goods delivery might be to mix intrusive measures with services related to economic and social infrastructure.

Although national identity is adversely affected by the interference of state actors during wartime, it can take a favorable turn if civilians begin to view themselves as benefitting from the state’s spending as a corrective measure for socioeconomic inequality in their society. Such a perception politicizes civilians to the extent that they come to view themselves as stakeholders in the development initiatives of the state (Böhnke and

Zürcher 2013). Civilians can then turn a critical eye toward the state as their ruler, to whom any demand or petition should be directed. Once civilians regard themselves as important actors in the state's projects, this change in mentality prompts them to strengthen their identification with the state as a legitimate sovereign entity. This psychological mechanism is expected to be salient in the context of civil war, wherein civilians are deficient in livelihood resources. If the state succeeds in providing relevant public services that increase their well-being, such generosity will assuredly be remembered by the civilians as a substantial part of the state's governance.

The Case: Acehese Civil War

The Indonesian government has traditionally combined accommodative and coercive strategies in response to insurrections in Aceh. During the *New Order* period of the Suharto administration (1966–98), counterinsurgency efforts largely relied on the security approach, where the use of coercive force was dominant (Schulze 2006, 244). Carrying out repressive operations, however, the administration implemented civic programs and development projects to mobilize the local population and leaders and officials to participate in its counterinsurgency (Kell, 1995, 75–81; Nessen 2006, 187; Sjamsuddin 1984, 114).⁶ It was during this period that local technocrats succeeded in improving infrastructure in the region (e.g., road and bridge construction and irrigation development) (McGibbon 2006, 325). At the local level, various programs were implemented to develop public health, education, welfare, and infrastructure to protect civilians from the rebels (Miller 2009, 115).

Under the post-New-Order decentralization after 1998, district and city officials were granted various powers in several public policies, including “local investment, trade and industry, public works, education, health, labour, agriculture, and the environment” (Miller 2009, 48). The poor condition of the region's infrastructure was a precondition for the central and provincial governments to be able to recover and improve them through public service provision. For instance, only about half of Aceh residents could access electricity and safe drinking water, and their health condition remained poor because medical treatment was

not routinely available (Miller 2009, 136). Much of the infrastructure was ruined because the GAM had destroyed local infrastructure, governmental apparatuses, and educational institutions to weaken the state's hold on Aceh (Schulze 2006, 229). Additionally, the civil legal system had become inoperable due to a lack of judges following harassment by the GAM (Miller 2006, 305; Miller 2009, 108). Aceh people, therefore, expected to receive increased benefits and services through the implementation of the autonomy law in 2001 (Miller 2006, 305). In other words, the failure of state actors to deliver public services undermined the effectiveness of winning popular support.

Data and Methods

Survey

To collect empirical data that could answer the question of this research, a questionnaire was administered in Aceh Province between December 2016 and January 2017 in collaboration with the Habibie Center (THC) and the Jaringan Survey Initiative (JSI). The survey paid attention to the locals who had interacted with state actors during wartime. It, therefore, focused on eight regencies/cities in the province, all of which were influenced by the civil war: Aceh Besar, Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Banda Aceh, Bireuen, Lhoksemauwe, Pidie, and Pidie Jaya (Figure 1). Because individuals' wartime experiences are well-accounted for by place of residence, we considered this sampling strategy the most appropriate. The survey was administered more than 10 years after the conflict, and approximately 92% of the respondents were living in the same regencies/cities where they had, for the most part, been residing at the time of the war's end in 2004-5.

A multistage sampling strategy was employed to locate possible respondents in the selected regencies/cities. First, we randomly selected half of the districts in the regencies/cities, from which at least about 10% of villages (gampong) were chosen at random. Second, targeted households within each gampong were identified through the random walk method. Third, respondents aged 17 or above were selected from these households while considering gender representation. Village population was used to determine how many respondents should be




Figure 1. Survey Locations

Table 1. Sampling Framework

Regency/city	No. of districts	No. of gampongs	Population	No. of sample districts	No. of sample gampongs	No. of espondents
Banda Aceh	9	90	236,190	5	9	84
Aceh Besar	23	604	381,367	12	60	136
Pidie	23	730	435,608	12	73	155
Pidie Jaya	8	222	155,830	4	22	55
Bireuen	17	609	429,049	9	61	152
Aceh Utara	27	852	569,426	14	85	202
Lhokseumawe	4	68	188,989	2	7	67
Aceh Timur	24	513	419,143	12	51	149
Total	135	3,688	2,815,602	68	369	1,000

Notes: The population for each regency/city is based on the aggregate data of populations per district (DAK2) in Semester II of 2015 (December 31, 2015), Ministry of Home Affairs.

interviewed in each survey location. The total number of collected responses was 1,000. Table 1 summarizes this framework of sampling.⁷

Variables

The survey asked several questions about the respondents' information, values, and experiences. In this article, we measured national identification with a question on how close respondents felt to Indonesia. They were requested to choose one of the answers ranging from "very close," "close," "not very close," "not close at all," or "cannot choose." The "cannot choose" responses were dropped from the following analyses so that we could capture the degree of individuals' sense of belonging to the state. The frequency distribution of this and other variables is summarized in Table 2. We can see that the respondents who felt "very close" and "close" to the state accounted for more than 40%, although those who did not were in the majority of the sample. We rescaled the values to range from 0 (not close at all) to 1 (very close) (Table 3).

The independent variable was measured by the questions on individuals' wartime experiences of public service provision by the Indonesian government. The respondents were asked whether there was any public service provision by the Indonesian government during three time periods: September 1998 to April 2003, May 2003 to November 2004, and December 2004 to August 2005.⁸ The types of public services about which they were questioned included infrastructure, welfare, security, and livelihood and business support (see Supplemental Materials for the verbatim text of the items). It would be misleading to assume that the state entirely succeeded or failed to implement the development of socioeconomic infrastructure because there would have been a large discrepancy in service reception as reported by individual civilians. Some may hardly have had contact with state agencies during wartime, but others may have enjoyed the benefits of public goods. The latter possibly tended to receive multiple services from the government throughout the examined periods. In addition, the mix of services received varied in terms of attribution and personal history. To gauge the level of public service reception, each dummy variable on a particular type of service was summed across the three periods. This led to the construction of eleven variables on individuals' experiences of public service reception. They were furthermore used to estimate the latent profile models that allowed the identification of groups (classes) that differed in their experiences of receiving state-led public services during wartime.⁹ The results suggest that eight latent classes could be extracted

Table 2. Frequency Distribution

Variables	Characteristics	Respondents (%)
Closeness to Indonesian identity	Very close	10.0
	Close	33.8
	Not very close	40.6
	Not close at all	15.6
Public service reception	High coverage	7.3
	Low coverage	37.8
	Education	7.8
	Security	4.8
	Welfare	24.7
	Welfare/ infrastructure	5.4
	Welfare/security/ livelihood (non-agriculture)	5.0
Exposure to violence	Welfare/security/infrastructure/ livelihood (agriculture)	7.2
	Livelihood damage	40.5
	High victimization	15.3
	Mid-level victimization	30.5
Wartime livelihood	Low victimization	13.7
	Government employee	2.9
	GAM rank-and-file	8.0
Intensity of Acehnese identity	GAM collaborator	1.2
	Very close	44.2
	Close	51.8
	Not very close	0.9
	Not close at all	0.2
Sex	N/A	2.9
	Female	36.8
	Male	63.2

Variables	Characteristics	Respondents (%)
Age	17–19	0.7
	20–29	14.7
	30–39	24.3
	40–49	28.1
	50–59	20.8
	60–69	9.4
	70–79	1.9
	80–89	0.1
Education	No formal education	3.1
	Elementary school/junior high school/middle school	43.6
	High school	39.4
	University/graduate school	13.9
Income (in rupiah)	Less than 600,000	7.5
	600,001–900,000	7.9
	900,001–1,250,000	14.3
	1,250,001–1,750,000	24.4
	1,750,001–2,500,000	31.4
	2,500,001–3,500,000	10.7
	3,500,001 or more	3.9

from these variables: 1) high coverage, 2) low coverage, 3) education, 4) security, 5) welfare, 6) welfare/infrastructure, 7) welfare/security/livelihood (non-agriculture), and 8) welfare/security/infrastructure/livelihood (agriculture). Table 4 summarizes the types of services that the respondents received in each class.¹⁰ Some types of service overlapped across latent classes; for instance, education services were reported to have been received by respondents belonging to classes 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and the (re)construction of village buildings by those who were in classes 1, 6, and 8. However, each class had a unique characteristic based on the

Table 3. Summary of Variables (Closeness to Indonesian Identity and Age)

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Closeness to Indonesian identity	917	0.461	0.289	0.000	1.000
Age (ln)	1000	3.725	0.297	2.833	4.407

combinations of particular services. The posterior class probabilities were further employed to create dummy variables indicating the respondents' class membership.

Wartime experiences of violence could have a potentially confounding effect on the dependent and explanatory variables by framing civilians' perceptions of perpetrators and polarizing local identities (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Wood 2008). First, other surveys on psychological needs assessments revealed that residents in high-conflict areas had mental health problems (Good et al. 2006; 2007). Problems that are highly associated with stress and trauma would be expected to affect how individuals view political agents. Second, civilians would have a greater chance of receiving public services from the state if territorial control were consolidated enough to exclusively use coercion against the locals. Although state actors must have in-depth interactions with civilians to deliver various services, this may cause civilian abuse as a by-product of wartime governance (Kalyvas 2006). Additionally, although such locations are not readily accessible to rebel actors, they could cause disturbances and interfere with the locals' relationship with the state. Our survey asked the respondents whether they would consider themselves victims of the civil war between 1976 and 2005. Because the items varied from physical damage to mental illness, the latent class models were estimated to identify patterns of victimization: livelihood damage, high victimization, mid-level victimization, and low victimization.¹¹

The controls included other confounding variables of individuals' demographic information and wartime livelihoods. As for the demography, respondents' sex and age were asked at the beginning of interviews; the former was captured by a dummy of female and the latter by continuous values. It is noted that "Age" was natural-logged for the

Table 4. Summary of Latent Classes and Public Service Reception

Class	Services received
1. High coverage	All types of services
2. Low coverage	None
3. Education	Education
4. Security	Security
5. Welfare	Medical care and education
6. Welfare/infrastructure	Medical care, education, village buildings, and roads/bridges
7. Welfare/security/ livelihood (non-agriculture)	Medical care, education, security, and financial services
8. Welfare/security/infrastructure/ livelihood (agriculture)	Medical care, education, security, village/religious buildings, roads/bridges, and agricultural support

following analyses (Table 3). Educational attainment was measured by a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (no formal education) to 4 (university/graduate school). Level of household income was also based on the Likert scale, and the responses ranged from 1 (Less than 600,000 rupiah) to 7 (3,500,001 rupiah or more). The respondents' ethnicity was measured by two items: self-perception as an Acehnese and closeness to the ethnic group. While the former was captured by a dummy, the latter was represented using a scale between 1 (Not close at all) and 4 (Very close). These items were multiplied so that the composite variable could capture the level of Acehnese identity. For wartime livelihood, we asked the respondents how they made a living before August 2005. The following analyses employ the items that seem to influence the effect of the government's public service provision on civilians' national identity: "Employed by the government," "Struggled along with the GAM," and "Paid by the GAM for information."¹² These variables were necessary to give structure to the wartime Aceh society that a friend-or-foe framework could not simply capture. While GAM activities largely relied on intelligence brought by local collaborators, a middle-class group emerged by the mid-1970s, which consisted of intelligentsia and officials as well as politicians who served the local government and businessmen who worked as government contractors and suppliers (Sulaiman 2006, 137).

Propensity Score Matching

For this study, we attempted to estimate a model that could regress post-civil war attitudes toward the state regarding the experience of public service reception. However, such a regression model causes a problem of confounding variables; individuals' characteristics could correlate with both public service reception and their identities. As wartime public service provision is an important component of counterinsurgency, such services may be provided strategically by the government; therefore, civilians would not have equal access to such services. The government could use public service provision to reward civilians for cooperative behavior. It is also possible that such services may be employed to expand the base of popular support by targeting those who were involved in rebel activities (e.g., providing information, food, and shelter). At the same time, civilians may move to (or away from) areas where the government intensively implements public service provision for strategic reasons. Therefore, an overestimation bias should be addressed in the empirical analysis because the model contains such a selection effect in addition to a service-provision effect.

We used the propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) to reduce the selection effect. The treatments were dummies for the latent classes of public service reception for each individual. Suppose that T_i is given 1 if individual i has experienced a particular pattern of public service reception during wartime, where X_i denotes the level of post-war national identity of i when he/she has received no such service and X_i^* is the level of national identity of i when he/she has received the service. The treatment effect of service provision is then $E[Y(1)|X_i] - E[Y(0)|X_i]$. We must estimate $E[Y(0)|X_i]$ counterfactually because T_i and X_i are not simultaneously observable. The treatment effects are assumed to be estimated by comparing the treated and non-treated individuals under the condition that pre-treatment characteristics X_i are similar or the same. The *unconfoundedness* assumption assumes that this pair of individuals are twins:

$$E[Y(0)|T = 1, X = x] = E[Y(0)|T = 0, X = x],$$

and

$$E[Y(I)|T = 1, X = x] = E[Y(I)|T = 0, X = x].$$

The treatment effect is then estimated by $E[Y(I)|T = 1, X = x] - E[Y(0)|T = 0, X = x]$. Relying on the *overlap* assumption, $c < (T = 1|X = x) < 1 - c$, the treatment observation is matched with the observation of the nearest or most similar precondition control observations ($0 < c < 1$).

Analysis

Civilians' Reception of State-Led Public Services

The results of logit estimation on the treatments are presented in Table 5.¹³ Individuals' exposure to wartime violence influenced some patterns of public service reception. While high victimization was not significant in any models, mid and low levels of victimization influenced some patterns of public service reception, at least at the 5% level. First, individuals with mid-level victimization tended to be provided security services by the government. This would make sense in that those who did not enjoy such services were more exposed to violence and resultantly suffered from severe victimization. At the same time, individuals with low victimization would not be provided security services unless the government found it necessary to protect them in emergent situations. However, mid-level victimization was positively associated with low coverage of public services as well; while the individuals tended to receive a variety of services, the extent of service provision was not intensive across the wartime periods. The results similarly indicate that they were less likely to receive high coverage of services, including welfare/security/livelihood (non-agriculture) and welfare/security/infrastructure/livelihood (agriculture). Second, the individuals who experienced less victimization tended to be poorly covered by the government's services; low victimization was negatively related to high coverage of public services but positively to low coverage. In particular, they were less likely to receive public services related to welfare, such as medical care and education.

As for wartime livelihood, government employees tended to receive more welfare services. Although it may seem counterintuitive that they

Table 5a. Logit Estimation Results for Public Service Reception

	1 High coverage	2 Low coverage	3 Education	4 Security
Sex (female)	0.023 (0.301)	0.253 (0.159)	0.030 (0.275)	-0.643 (0.363)
Age (ln)	0.514 (0.597)	-1.019** (0.297)	0.306 (0.505)	0.149 (0.605)
Education	0.454* (0.228)	0.034 (0.123)	-0.314 (0.207)	0.547* (0.258)
Income	0.170 (0.112)	0.067 (0.055)	0.151 (0.095)	-0.091 (0.116)
Intensity of Acehnese identity	-0.127 (0.167)	-0.259** (0.093)	0.168 (0.177)	-0.146 (0.191)
High victimization	-0.388 (0.406)	-0.396 (0.250)	0.593 (0.325)	-0.125 (0.595)
Mid-level victimization	-1.445** (0.410)	0.591** (0.176)	-0.293 (0.326)	0.930* (0.361)
Low victimization	-1.369* (0.618)	1.106** (0.241)	-0.302 (0.469)	-0.646 (0.774)
Government employment	-1.396 (1.071)	-0.806 (0.495)	-0.882 (1.046)	-0.769 (1.067)
GAM rank-and- file	-0.325 (0.653)	1.165** (0.302)	-0.124 (0.464)	-0.150 (0.771)
GAM collaboration	0.421 (1.131)	0.556 (0.699)	-0.291 (1.102)	
Constant	-5.579* (2.625)	3.309* (1.325)	-3.920 (2.269)	-4.233 (2.704)
Observations	870	870	870	860

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

did not benefit from working for the government except for their access to services related to medical care and education, the results imply that the state did not use public services to reward the residents for their loyalty. GAM rank-and-file workers, meanwhile, were less likely to be covered by the state's public service provision. This can be understood from two standpoints. First, they may have been discriminated against in the provision of public services. In this sense, the government would not have used public services to expand its base of popular support but to

Table 5b. Logit Estimation Results for Public Service Reception (Cont.)

	5 Welfare	6 Welfare/ infrastructure	7 Welfare/ security/ livelihood (non- agriculture)	8 Welfare/security/ infrastructure/ livelihood (agriculture)
Sex (female)	-0.214 (0.178)	-0.221 (0.361)	0.243 (0.320)	0.090 (0.281)
Age (ln)	0.550 (0.324)	-0.326 (0.662)	-0.092 (0.624)	1.256* (0.563)
Education	-0.317* (0.137)	0.340 (0.271)	-0.461 (0.250)	0.364 (0.216)
Income	-0.227** (0.059)	-0.079 (0.117)	0.236* (0.118)	0.063 (0.099)
Intensity of Acehnese identity	0.210 (0.111)	0.059 (0.234)	0.143 (0.210)	0.245 (0.201)
High victimization	0.067 (0.241)	-0.052 (0.524)	-0.417 (0.449)	0.593 (0.337)
Mid-level victimization	0.023 (0.193)	-0.001 (0.403)	-1.052* (0.413)	-0.801* (0.380)
Low victimization	-0.624* (0.313)	0.190 (0.537)	-1.091 (0.624)	0.067 (0.424)
Government employment	1.019* (0.430)	1.174 (0.620)	-0.457 (1.070)	0.233 (0.603)
GAM rank-and- file	-0.719* (0.361)	0.028 (0.691)	-0.692 (0.771)	-0.834 (0.642)
GAM collaboration	-0.911 (1.083)	1.072 (1.158)		0.197 (1.134)
Constant	-1.990 (1.467)	-2.699 (2.940)	-2.384 (2.786)	-9.238** (2.551)
Observations	870	870	860	870

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

punish rebel rank-and-file workers by making the distinction in service provision with non-rebels. Second, however, those who acted in line with the GAM may have long been absent from areas that the government was able to reach when providing public services. In addition, the variable *GAM rank-and-file* is not significant for the other patterns of public

service reception except for welfare. *GAM collaborator* is not significant at the 5% level throughout the models. Collaboration with rebels is often carried out covertly, and the civilians who provide rebels with information, food, and shelter tend to hide among those who do not. In this sense, it is difficult for the state to differentiate in its public service provision between the former and the latter.

Individuals' reception of services is also linked to their demographic attributions. For instance, those who perceived themselves as Acehnese and felt close to the ethnicity tended to be able to avoid low coverage of wartime public service provision. However, the results also suggest that these individuals did not receive a mix of highly-covered services. Younger people tended to be covered less by the state's services. Older adults received more services related to welfare/security/infrastructure/livelihood (agriculture). In addition, educational attainment was associated positively with both high coverage of services and security and negatively with welfare services. Household income was positively related to welfare/security/livelihood (non-agriculture) but negatively to welfare services. While financially better-off individuals were excluded from the provision of welfare services, they tended to receive such services when they were packaged with services such as security and livelihood support.

Post-War National Identity

After the cases were randomized, propensity scores were employed to match each treatment observation with five control observations¹⁴ that were repeatedly used for matching.¹⁵ The following analysis deals with the sample of individuals who experienced particular patterns of service reception and those who were most likely to receive those services but did not in reality. Reducing selection biases, the matching made treatment observations comparable to control observations; the balance check of covariates showed that standardized differences were below 0.2 (see Cohen 1988).

Table 6 shows the average treatment effects (ATE) of wartime public service reception on post-war national identity. The variable, *Education*, had a negative effect on national identity; those who recalled the wartime provision of education by the state were more likely to have a weak

Table 6. ATEs of Public Service Reception

	ATE
High coverage	0.132** (0.047)
Low coverage	-0.006 (0.022)
Education	-0.091* (0.039)
Security	-0.163** (0.049)
Welfare	-0.015 (0.026)
Welfare/infrastructure	-0.044 (0.057)
Welfare/security/livelihood (non-agriculture)	-0.016 (0.058)
Welfare/security/infrastructure/ livelihood (agriculture)	0.176** (0.047)

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

national identity in the post-war period. Despite the autonomy of the province, the state had control over education systems and affairs in Aceh. Such state-led initiatives may have been viewed as an interference in local autonomy. State-led education was counterproductive in promoting pro-state attitudes among civilians, who were skeptical about it.

The coefficient of security was also negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that those who received security services during wartime were more likely to have weak identification with the state. Civilians would have viewed the presence of state forces as outside interference in their local communities. This may be exemplified by the fact that in state-controlled areas, the military demanded residents to organize self-defense groups to render the counterinsurgency efficient. Civilians' attitude toward the state would also have been undermined by the violence directed at them by the security forces, which included physical abuse, destruction, and theft of their property during searches for rebels (Schulze 2006, 248-9). In addition to the fact that many ordinary civilians were victimized in counterinsurgency operations, the military's

governance (e.g., martial law) restricted the locals' freedom of movement. The locals viewed the police and military forces as anti-Acehnese by the end of Habibie's presidency (Miller 2009, 40).

The results provide mixed findings on security services when they are delivered along with other services. First, the negative effect of security services disappears when they are combined with welfare services and livelihood support in non-agriculture activities. The successful development of socioeconomic infrastructure should make civilians perceive themselves as important members of the state. The state's intention in such situations is to increase its coercive power or the material quality of life among civilians, or even both, by combining various services (Morgan 2016, 8). Despite such expectations, this mix of public service reception neither heightened nor lowered the post-war national identification among Acehnese. This may be due to the fact that the effect of such services is not strong enough to overcome the adverse effect of security services. Second, however, if security is provided with welfare, physical infrastructure, and livelihood support in agriculture, post-war national identity becomes stronger. The addition of infrastructural (village and religious buildings and roads/bridges) and agricultural support shows a different response than is elicited by the combination of welfare and support in non-agriculture sectors. The results imply that the provision of communal infrastructure is effective in evoking a sense of belonging to the state. Increasing agricultural productivity is also crucial for a large population of Aceh residents.¹⁶

High coverage remarkably shows this additive effect of particular services on national identity. The ATE of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that if individuals receive a substantial package of public services, they are more likely to have a strong national identity in the post-war context. Although education and security services may have a negative effect on attitudes toward the state, this negativity may be reduced by the reception of additional services. Furthermore, individuals who were highly covered by public service provision tended to consider themselves as having been treated favorably by the state. In this sense, it is understandable that *low coverage* has no impact on the dependent variable. The result does not confirm that poorly covered individuals are less likely to feel close to the state, but it implies that this pattern of public service reception does not cause any change

in the strength of national identity. The unfavorable provision of public services may have had no influence because the Acehnese had long been treated unequally by the state. This socio-political context may have lowered civilians' expectations regarding public services.

Similarly, the reception of a single service or a couple of services appeared to have no impact on post-civil war national identity. Individuals' sense of belonging to the state was neither strengthened nor weakened by patterns of public service provision such as providing welfare and welfare/infrastructure. For the state to enhance national identity, it needs to deliver these services along with additional ones. For instance, if welfare/infrastructure is combined with livelihood support in agriculture and security, the mix of services tends to increase the strength of national identity ($\beta = 0.176$, $p < 0.01$). Another way to encourage a pro-state view is to substantially supplement core services with other ones. When individuals have satisfactorily received all types of services, they tend to identify themselves as important members of the state apparatus and consequentially become likely to have a stronger sense of belonging to the state ($\beta = 0.132$, $p < 0.01$).

Figure 2 illustrates these results with the mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the ATEs. It also shows that the treatment variables—*High coverage* and *Welfare/security/infrastructure/livelihood (agriculture)*—have positive effects on national identity, whereas *Education* and *Security* are negatively associated with the dependent variable. The findings again hold that although locals tend to react adversely to the state's interference in local culture and maintaining order, they acknowledge the public goods if numerous types of services are combined. Whether positive or negative, the confidence intervals of these treatment effects largely overlap with each other. In other words, there is no particular pattern of public service provision with a superior or inferior effect on national identity that is distinguishable from the others.

The other treatment effects cannot be distinguished from zero. Low coverage is influential, but it may have a negative or negligible impact on national identity. Having a wide confidence interval, the ATE of *Welfare/infrastructure* shows that the effect may be negligible or positive. Although such a mix of public services is expected to have some influence on civilians' views of governance agents, its effect on national identity is limited if it does not sufficiently promote the sense that they




Figure 2. ATEs of Public Service Reception

are stakeholders in state projects. The confidence intervals of *Welfare* and *Welfare/security/livelihood (non-agriculture)* range from -0.066 to 0.037 and -0.131 to 0.098, respectively; these treatment effects do not significantly hold true at the 5% level.

Discussion

In civil war, state actors often attempt to win “hearts and minds” by delivering public services to civilians. However, such public service provision is not always productive in gaining popular support, and its effects can vary between service patterns. While wartime measures aiming to gain public support are often designed to facilitate counterinsurgency operations, they may bring about unexpected consequences in the long run and in the post-civil war context in particular. In the Acehnese Civil War, educational services had a negative effect on civilians’ attitudes toward Indonesia; individuals with wartime experiences of state-led educational programs tended to have weak national identity in the post-war period. The introduction of state institutions may have alienated

the locals when it was viewed as an interference in Acehese culture. In addition, the maintenance of security, which is a major purpose of counterinsurgency, did not necessarily contribute to strengthening post-war national identity among civilians who were drawn into the conflict between the state and ethno-separatist rebels. The locals could have viewed the presence of state forces as coercive interference in their society under the pretext of the civil war. However, this study shows that the addition of other services alleviated the negative effect of education and security services on civilians' national identity. The reception of public services made individuals feel closer to the state even if such services were provided in combination with other ones. The wide range of services provided increased the strength of national identity among Acehese people.

Conclusion

The findings of this article provide implications that are relevant to counterinsurgency and post-conflict nation-building. It is important for the state to reconstruct its relationship with locals so that it can re-create the nation and prevent future rebellion. Counterinsurgency operations primarily rely on military means, and the state often justifies its strategy with the objective of maintaining public peace and order. However, this article reveals that the recipients do not always perceive the state's provision of such services as such. Services related to education and security may appear to indicate the state's exercise of coercive power over civilians in peripheral regions. In this case, the state's services may not be considered "services" at all. Such a counterproductive effect can persist after the civil war ends. The fragmentation of identity, if any, should be addressed by considering the state-society relations that determine how public goods are viewed by civilians.

These findings could also expand the theoretical knowledge of public goods and citizen perceptions of national identity beyond the context of civil war. The provision of public services is considered an essential role of the modern state and an effective instrument to gain not merely "hearts and minds" but also political legitimacy among the population; the state could be labeled unsuccessful if it is unwilling or unable to meet

the nation's demands regarding the development of its socioeconomic infrastructure. However, the findings imply that the link between public services and attitudes toward the state is not straightforward and that service provision may rather compromise the provider's reputation. We can, therefore, infer that, in regions with anti-state sentiment, the state's services do not merely have a null effect on national identity but may incite negative reactions from the population. A possible strategy drawn from this argument would be for the state to avoid meddling in everything and leave some duties to the local actors. This should alleviate perceptions regarding the coercive nature of the state's interference in local affairs by esteeming locals' efforts.

The findings of this article were primarily produced by examining the case study of the Acehnese conflict. The Acehnese Civil War is distinguished from some other cases of ethno-separatist conflict in that it was terminated by negotiations between the state and rebel group after the 2004 tsunami. With the rapid cessation of conflict, the GAM's influence remains in post-conflict Aceh. Additionally, while the state has maintained its status since the end of the war, former rebel leaders have organized political parties and joined the local government and assembly. Therefore, the wartime framework of state-society relations more or less persists in the post-war period. In other words, in a civil war where the rebels overturn the incumbent government, the civilians' reception of public services from the state should be much less important in determining their national identity. Provided that the interaction between political actors and local residents largely influences national identity, the effect of wartime public policies on post-war values and norms is worth examining in those cases as well.

Notes

- 1 Civilians were also victimized by rebels' extortion and violence particularly in the countryside (Kurniawan 2018, 110).
- 2 Yet, it is also argued that the state's institutionalization of nationalism had effectively discouraged the development of Acehnese identity among local population even before the war (Siegel 2000).
- 3 In addition to a series of autonomy laws that granted limited administrative authority to sub-provincial units, Aceh was formally given a 'special status' in 1999.

- 4 An important exception includes Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013), who show that development programs enhanced the positive attitude among civilians toward the government in Afghanistan.
- 5 In general, public services that require resources for their provision would encourage civilians to view the state as legitimate in maintaining domestic order (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Böhnke, Koehler, and Zürcher 2017; Böhnke and Zürcher 2013).
- 6 As in other cases of civil war, Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) undertook many tasks in the civil administration under military emergency (especially of the Megawati administration in 2003) (Miller 2006, 308).
- 7 The survey procedure, including the management of enumerators and the implementation of fieldwork, is discussed in the ‘Survey Procedure’ section (pp. 1-2) in Supplemental Materials.
- 8 Each period represents a notable phase of the war situation. After 1998 (the end of New Order period), the Indonesian state was expected to embark on the provision of public services to Aceh in line with decentralization, including autonomy of the province. Although the state-rebel relations deteriorated in early 2000s (e.g., the imposition of martial law by the Megawati administration in 2003), the state still kept a window open for providing services to the locals.
- 9 It is possible for us to create classes of which services should matter instead of letting the latent profile analysis do so. However, because patterns of service reception vary between civil-war cases, no relevant knowledge is available and researchers’ selection of variables could fall arbitrary. Therefore, we inductively extracted latent classes from the survey data. See pp. 2-3 on Supplemental Materials for discussion on the method.
- 10 See the ‘Service Reception’ section (pp. 3-6) in Supplemental Materials for results of the analysis.
- 11 See the ‘Victimization’ section (pp. 6-8) in Supplemental Materials.
- 12 These items are part of a question with multiple answers such as ‘self-employed’, ‘employed by private company’, ‘student’, and ‘unemployed’. The sum of the frequencies is not/less than 100 per cent for this reason.
- 13 The variable *GAM collaborator* is dropped from Models 4 and 7 due to collinearity with the other covariates.
- 14 Stuart (2010) argues that k:1 nearest neighbor matching is a good choice for data that have many more control individuals than treated individuals.
- 15 The replacement of control observations is an accepted option for nearest neighbour matching (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
- 16 Agriculture was the largest sector of the Acehnese economy in terms of number of employees (World Bank 2007).

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通过战时服务提供促进国家认同？来自印度尼西亚亚齐的证据

摘要：在内战中，国家行为体通过向平民提供公共服务来赢得他们的“民心”。由于平民对当地发展和秩序的需求，战时公共服务的提供应该有助于国家获得民众支持并扩大支持国家的群众基础。然而，在叛乱分子正在为分离而斗争的背景下，提供某些类型的公共服务可能会产生适得其反的效果。通过对印度尼西亚亚齐收集的新调查数据进行分析，我们发现，虽然平民在战时接受国家主导的教育和安全服务会显著削弱他们在战后对国家的归属感，但如果平民还获得了大量其他有意义的服务，这些负面影响可以得到缓解。战时公共服务的提供并不总是被接受者视为积极行为，并可能给人留下国家在外围地区对平民行使强制权力的印象。

关键词：国家认同、战时服务提供、内战、印度尼西亚

전시 서비스 제공을 통한 국가 정체성 제고? 인도네시아 아체의 증거

초록 : 내전에서 국가 행위자는 민간인의 “마음과 지지”를 얻고자 민간인에게 공공 서비스를 제공한다. 전시 공공 서비스 제공은 지역의 개발과 질서에 대한 민간인의 요구에 따라 국가가 국민의 지지를 확보하고 국가에 찬성하는 국민을 늘리는 것에 도움이 된다. 하지만 반군이 분리독립을 하려는 경우 특정 유형의 공공 서비스 제공은 역효과를 일으킬 수 있다. 인도네시아 아체에서 수집한 새로운 설문조사 데이터를 조사한 결과, 국가 주도 교육 및 안보 서비스를 받은 민간인의 전시 경험은 전후 국가에 대한 소속감을 유의하게 감소시켰다. 단, 민간인이 실질적으로 많은 수의 유의미한 서비스를 추가로 받은 경우, 이러한 부정적인 영향이 완화되었다. 전시 공공 서비스 제공이 그 대상자에게 언제나 긍정적으로 인식되는 것은 아니며, 국가가 해당 지역의 민간인에게 강압적인 권력을 행사한다는 인상을 줄 수 있다.

주요어 : 국가 정체성, 전시 서비스 제공, 내전, 인도네시아

戦時中のサービス提供を通じたナショナル・アイデンティティの促進? アチェ州(インドネシア)からのエビデンス

概要：内戦において、国家主体は市民に対して公共サービスを提供し、その「心とこころ」を獲得する。戦時中の公共サービス提供は、地域の発展と秩序への民間人の需要ゆえに、国家は民衆の支持を得て、親国家的人口の拡大に貢献するはずである。しかしながら、反政府勢力が分離を求めて奮闘している状況では、ある種の公共サービスの提供は逆効果になりかねない。アチェ州(インドネシア)で収集された新しい調査データを検討した結果、戦時中に国家主導の教育や治安維持サービスを受けた民間人の経験は、戦後は国家への帰属意識を有意に低下させたが、相当数の意義あるサービスを付加的に受けた場合には、このような負の影響は軽減されることがわかった。戦時中の公共サービス提供は、必ずしも受益者に肯定的に受け止められるとは限らず、国家が周辺地域の民間人に強制力を行使しているという印象を与える可能性がある。

キーワード：ナショナル・アイデンティティ、戦時中のサービス提供、内戦、インドネシア

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