

Social and Partisan Cleavages and the Demand and Supply of Democracy

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Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between social and partisan cleavages and the demand and supply of democracy. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it argues that social heterogeneity is not inherently detrimental to democracy. Instead, the impact of social diversity is mediated by the composition of ethnic and social groups, which influences the intensity of electoral competition. While highly homogeneous and heterogeneous societies tend to have higher satisfaction with democracy, societies with an approximately even distribution of groups experience intense competition and lower satisfaction. This study utilizes data from the Global Barometer Surveys (2010–2013) across six regions to examine the relationship between preferences and satisfaction with democracy, along with ethnolinguistic, religious, and partisan cleavages. These findings suggest that the composition of cleavages, rather than their mere presence, is the key factor in determining the success of democracy. This study underscores the crucial role of institutional design in managing electoral competition.

Keywords: Democracy, Social Cleavages, Ethnic Conflict, Party Systems, Political Polarization

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Introduction

Social cleavages are divisions in the populace. They can be along the lines of class, ethnolinguistic, religious, or partisan affiliations. Social cleavages are the sources of conflicts, and severely politicized cleavages can be detrimental to political stability and national cohesion. In authoritarian regimes, the demands of social groups are often suppressed to preserve social stability. However, repression is usually not an option in democracy. Democracy allows conflicts to be resolved through a series of mechanisms, and through that, to reach consensus. However, to strike a careful balance between conflict and consensus, intense competition between social groups would not destabilize politics together because democracy is the most difficult to maintain among all political systems (Diamond, 1990). Moreover, as democracy relies on elections to determine who obtains state power, it divides the electorate into winners and losers. In socially diverse societies, voting decisions are likely to be based on one's identity. Thus, the composition of social groups largely determines winners and losers. Feelings of inclusion and exclusion are further strengthened through electoral competition, making conflict more likely in socially diverse societies (Horowitz, 1993). Conventional wisdom suggests that it is difficult to achieve and maintain democracy in socially heterogeneous countries.

This study contends that social cleavages are not necessarily harmful to democracy or vice versa. In socially heterogeneous societies, democracy provides mechanisms for various social groups to voice their concerns and protect their interests. When the interests of social groups are mapped onto the party system, this development can boost citizens' satisfaction with democracy. As political parties represent different interests, social groups have channels to express their concerns. Moreover, parties vie for state power on citizens' behalf and usually engage in strategic behavior to ensure electoral victory, including building cross-cutting alliances. Competitions under well-functioning party systems ensure representation, and alliances between parties can sometimes guarantee power sharing, making electoral defeats relatively easy to swallow. However, the composition of social groups is also important. Citizens are more likely to prefer and be satisfied with democracy when the level of heterogeneity is either relatively low or

high. When two social groups of equal size are present, preferences and satisfaction tend to be low. Equal-sized groups are more likely to face fierce competition, and consequently, polarize politics. Political polarization then turns healthy competitions into malign ones, making democracy undesirable for citizens.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section discusses in greater detail the relationship between societal and partisan cleavages and democracy. Then, the association between democracy in demand and supply is presented, based on the results of the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS2, 2010–2013). The fourth section investigates the linkages between democracy and ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization. The following section describes the relationship between democracy and partisan cleavage. The final section provides the theoretical and policy implications followed by conclusions.

Social and Partisan Cleavages and Democracy

The negative impact of social and ethnic cleavages on democracy and democratization is well documented. Third-wave democratization was accompanied by rising ethnic conflicts on the African continent. The liberation of the former Soviet states also came with devastating ethnic conflicts, with an extreme case occurring in former Yugoslavia. These real-world events have led to the belief that conflicts are more likely to occur in ethnically diverse societies when these countries are democratized. Scholars have argued that such conflicts occur because of politicians' mobilization along social and ethnic cleavages (Rustow, 1970; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz, 1985). As democracy allows different social groups and parties to compete in the electoral arena, it allows politicians and parties to maneuver voters along different lines of divisions. As parties and politicians have little time to establish credible promises for voters, they resort to ethnic identity to appeal for support. Ethnic identity is thought to be fixed and unchangeable (i.e. primordialism); thus, it is a convenient tool for politicians to mobilize voters with a simple signal of "us" versus "them." When voters cast an ethnic vote, electoral victory is largely determined by the composition of the ethnic groups. Under such circumstances, minority groups may

revolt because access to state power is limited by electoral competition. Although recent studies have argued that ethnic identity is not primordial but is constructed through historical processes and politicians' instrumental motives (Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2005; Fenton, 1999), electoral competition that defines democracy remains the reason for politicizing social cleavages that leads to conflicts and civil wars.

Electoral competition divides an electorate into two categories. The election results further sort voters into winner's and loser's camps. The principle of majority rule, another characteristic of democracy, provides an additional incentive to politicize ethnic identity to secure electoral victory. On the one hand, politicians have the incentive to draw lines of ethnicity to ensure majority support. On the other hand, voters have the incentive to be in the winner's camp to get their preferred policies implemented. When electoral competition is perceived as a zero-sum game, conflicts are inevitable because political stakes are too high. However, this does not mean that ethnic conflicts are more likely to occur in newly democratized countries. Through careful institutional design, ethnic tensions can be mitigated through power-sharing and respect for minority cultures and rights (Lijphart, 1977; Reilly 2001; Sisk, 1995). Some ethnic groups might not be able to win state power owing to their small populations, but ethnic antagonism can be alleviated if those ethnic groups can get representation in the National Assembly or conduct self-rule in their homelands.

However, institutional designs should consider ethnic composition. For instance, an electoral system of proportional representation is proposed to increase minority representation in the National Assembly. However, if ethnic groups tend to concentrate in certain localities, the first-past-the-post system would benefit minority representation as well (Moser, 2008). In other words, the composition of ethnic groups is the key to determining the nature of political competitions, and formal institutions can be designed to translate this composition into political power.

However, numbers are still important. Horowitz (1985) found that severe ethnic conflict is less likely to occur in highly homogenous and heterogeneous societies. Societies with a predominant ethnic majority are more likely to be politically stable (Freedom House, 1999). Highly diverse societies in which no ethnic groups can dominate also tend to

have long-lasting democracies, such as India and Papua New Guinea (Chandra, 2005; Reilly, 2006). These findings indicate that countries in the middle of the ethnic composition may have difficulty avoiding severe conflict. In the case of a homogenous society or one with a predominant ethnic group, a small number of minorities cannot challenge the majority. In highly diverse societies with no dominant ethnic group, every ethnic group can have a say in politics, including forming multi-ethnic alliances to share power. It is when there are two ethnic groups of roughly equal size and either can dominate by itself, but would be able to do so by allying with other minor ethnic groups that conflicts are likely to occur. This situation pushes politics toward polarization and may eventually destroy it. In other words, different ethnic group compositions ultimately affect electoral competition, and politicians adopt the best strategies, which might instigate ethnic antagonism that leads to ethnic conflicts and civil wars.

Democracy Beyond Electoral Competition

Despite the sound arguments presented above, democracy is not only about electoral competition but also about procedures that protect individual freedoms and rights.

Democratic institutions also offer citizens the opportunity to express their interests and concerns. A democracy is a political system that encourages the expression of multiple perspectives. Thus, in theory, a heterogeneous society might prefer democracy to other regime types owing to the respect for pluralism. However, such preference might plummet and turn into dissatisfaction if different groups find their interests not respected and represented in the system. Whether ethnic and social groups can find expression in political parties is crucial for the sustainability of democracy.

Ideally, parties represent different interests of citizens and compete in the electoral arena to win state power under democratic regimes. The Lipset-Rokkan paradigm states that when parties represent the interests of different social cleavages, a party system is “frozen” to reflect a society’s cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). However, in newly democratized countries, usually, parties do not rely on ideological

linkages to win support from voters but instead depend on clientelism or patronage to “buy” votes (Chandra, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). As parties of the latter sort do not appeal to voters with ideology, they do not seek to activate or politicize social cleavages. In such an environment, parties’ electoral fortune changes dramatically from one election to another because voters do not have loyal attachments to parties, for they vote for parties and candidates who can offer the best deal to buy their votes immediately before every election. Consequently, a party system is fluid or under-institutionalized owing to a lack of ideological or programmatic linkages between parties and voters (Mainwaring 1998).

An institutionalized party system is deemed important for the quality of democracy. A party system that reflects the structure of social cleavages should facilitate plurality and defend the interests of social groups. Scholars have included the characteristics of party systems as a category for measuring levels of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2011). One of the indicators measuring party system institutionalization is the percentage of partisan supporters in a polity. For instance, Dalton and Weldon (2007) warned that detachment from parties was a threat to representative democracy. Partisan cleavages, therefore, are crucial to citizens’ satisfaction with democracy because the interests of different social groups are represented by political parties. Similarly, the more citizens trust a party system, the more likely it is for democracy to endure.

Despite conventional wisdom stating the negative impact of democratization on socially diverse societies owing to electoral competition, ethnic conflicts do not necessarily occur under the conditions of democratization and ethnic heterogeneity.

The configuration of social groups determines how electoral competition unfolds, and ethnic conflicts are less unlikely to occur in highly homogenous and heterogeneous societies because composition usually does not trigger intense competition. Democracy also involves procedures that protect individual and group rights. Thus, aspirations for democracy are likely to be high in socially diverse societies; however, how these procedures are carried out affects satisfaction with democratic regimes. If political parties represent social cleavages, the satisfaction level should be high, because the interests of social groups are represented by those parties. In other words, we expect that ethnic composition and party system institutionalization would affect people’s attitudes toward

democracy. The following sections test this conjecture. The measurement of preferences for and satisfaction with democracy is discussed in the following section. The subjective and objective measures of democracy are compared to ensure that the ensuing analyses are meaningful.

The Relationship between Democracy in Demand and Supply

Democracy in demand and supply represents citizens' different attitudes toward a democratic regime. While democracy in demand signifies aspirations to have political institutions that balance power and protect individual freedom and rights, democracy in supply reflects whether these aspirations have been realized. In this study, democracy in demand is understood through the question "Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government." Conversely, democracy in supply is measured by the question "On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in [Country]." Note that the word "democracy" is used in every country regardless of the country's level of democracy by academic definition. Thus, citizens' perceptions of "democracy" might depend on context, including political situations, official and media interpretations, and daily experiences. If this is the case, we might end up comparing oranges with apples because "democracy" is understood differently in different countries.

To ensure that citizens living under different regime types have at least some common understanding of democracy, Figure 1 investigates the relationships between the objective measures of democracy provided by Freedom House and perceptions of democracy in demand and supply. Democracy liberates people from political constraints and is valued in their own rights. Thus, people living in non-democratic countries may long for democracy. Meanwhile, they may have been disgruntled by the present political situation, showing a high level of dissatisfaction. The two panels in Figure 1 support this conjecture. On average, the percentage of the preference for democracy increases in both partly free and non-free countries. By contrast, satisfaction with democracy decreases in less-free countries. The graphs clearly demonstrate that citizens from different regime types have at least some common understanding of the meaning




Figure 1. The Relationship between Objective and Subjective Measures of Democracy

of democracy. However, there are some exceptions. Regions such as Africa and South Asia do not follow expectations; people living under authoritarian regimes prefer democracy less than their counterparts in democratic regimes. People in East Asia and Eurasia tend to be satisfied with democracy when living in authoritarian countries. The findings indicate that, in some regions, the perception of democracy does not necessarily follow an academic definition. In other words, there are other factors affecting citizens' assessments.

Logically speaking, democracy may have a positive or negative relationship in terms of demand and supply. Assuming that people always prefer democracy, this relationship becomes negative when democracy cannot deliver what is promised. In other words, if citizens are satisfied with how democracy works in the country, they should prefer this type of regime over others. In either case, gaps between demand and supply occur when regimes cannot satisfy their citizens. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between preferences for and satisfaction with democracy. The graph shows a positive relationship, meaning that when citizens are satisfied with democracy, they also prefer regime type, and vice versa. However, people in the Arab world show the opposite trend: while they might prefer democracy, their satisfaction level tends to be low. This finding indicates that satisfaction levels can usually catch up with aspirations, except in the Middle East.

When examined closely, the preference for democracy is usually higher than satisfaction, except for countries in East Asia, which show the opposite trend (Figure 3). There, preference is relatively lower than satisfaction. Another large gap occurs in the Arab world, where the aspiration for democracy is high but the supply is in deficit.

Both regions harbor the most authoritarian regimes in the world, but their quality of governance differs. In East Asia, good economic performance strengthens the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, and liberal democracy is at times contended not compatible with "Asian values" and cultural heritage (Emmerson, 1995; Thompson, 2001). This is probably why the preference for democracy is relatively low in East Asia, as authoritarian regimes provide an alternative to challenge the liberal democracy model. Thus, it is not surprising that satisfaction with democracy is the highest in East Asia owing to the good economic performance of several authoritarian regimes. As the perception of




Figure 2. Relationships between Preference for and Satisfaction with Democracy

democracy generally follows an academic definition, it might seem odd that people living in authoritarian regimes are highly satisfied with the way “democracy” works in their countries. However, as authoritarian regimes usually use “democracy” to portray themselves, this might blur people’s perceptions about the meaning of democracy, particularly in East Asia. Nevertheless, the gap between preferences and satisfaction follows the expectations of the Arab world. The demand for democracy is high, but consequent events after the Arab Spring have contributed to low satisfaction in the region.

Overall, citizens across the regions share a common understanding of democracy. In authoritarian regimes, the demand for democracy is high, but satisfaction with it is low. Moreover, regional variations in the Arab world have the highest demand for democracy, but East Asians are the most satisfied citizens worldwide. However, does ethnic fractionalization lead to outcomes in addition to differences in government performance? East Asia has a relatively homogeneous society, which may explain its




Figure 3. Democracy in Demand and Supply across Regions

high satisfaction. The next section examines this aspect.

Ethnolinguistic and Religious Cleavages and Democracy

A basic assumption about ethnic cleavages and democracy is that highly diverse societies usually face difficulties in the onset and maintenance of democracy. However, ethnic groups might long for democracy because it provides mechanisms and institutions to solve conflicts, ease tensions, and protect individual and group rights. However, the principle of majority rule may permanently place a minority in an inferior position and eventually raise their level of dissatisfaction. The paradox of democracy is that it allows conflicts to be unleashed, but polarized cleavages might intensify competition and make conflicts out of control. In this situation, satisfaction levels might drop because of fierce competition between ethnic groups.

Using Desmet et al.'s (2012) two levels of measures of




Figure 4. Fractionalization Levels across Regions

ethnolinguistic cleavages, we investigate how social diversity affects people’s preferences for and satisfaction with democracy. The different

aggregation levels are based on “language tree” or phylogenetic approach that classifies languages in terms of family structure. For instance, the languages spoken in Pakistan have two origins: Indo-European and Dravidian. Under Indo-European origin, the Indo-Iranian language can be further classified into Iranian and Indo-Aryan languages. These languages are further classified into dialects. Thus, the further down the tree, the more fragmented a society is. Desmet et al. (2012) compiled 15 levels of aggregation and found that level 1 explained the outburst of civil war better than the other levels. However, higher levels are associated with poorer economic performance. Desmet et al. argued that level 1 fractionalization is related to divisions dating back to ancient history, but higher levels are just branches sharing the same origin. Antagonism is usually high in the first case, but obstacles to cooperation tend to occur in the latter. Therefore, they conclude that not every level of fractionalization is associated with ethnic conflicts; it also depends on the nature of fractionalization.

This study uses the middle (6th) and the last (15th) levels to investigate the relationship between democracy and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. This is because citizens’ attitudes toward democracy are based on their daily experiences. Politicians also have an incentive to emphasize divisions based on a finer definition of ethnicity (otherwise, there is no division at all at the lower level, in most cases).

Thus, aggregation at higher levels reflects people’s perceptions of divisions better than aggregation at lower levels. Across regions, Latin America has the most homogeneous societies on average, whereas Africa and South Asia have the most diverse societies at both levels. East Asia is more homogenous than the Arab world at level 6. However, the two regions are equally diverse at level 15. Therefore, it seems that ethnolinguistic fractionalization can, to some extent, explain why East Asians are more satisfied with democracy than their Arabic counterparts.

Figure 5 shows the relationship between preferences for democracy and ethnic fractionalization at both levels. On average, heterogeneous societies tend to prefer democracy over homogeneous societies, although the difference is trivial. However, the different compositions show slightly different trends. The preference level increases when societies become more heterogeneous, drops in countries with a median-high level of heterogeneity, and then increases again in highly diverse societies.




Figure 5. Ethnolinguistic Cleavages and Preference for Democracy




Figure 6. Ethnolinguistic Cleavages and Satisfaction with Democracy




Figure 7. Religious Cleavages and Preference for and Satisfaction with Democracy

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, highly fragmented countries tend to be more satisfied with their regimes. However, it seems that when two ethnic groups have roughly equal populations (0.4-0.6), satisfaction decreases. It then increases again and decreases in severely diverse societies. The trend observed here differs from that observed in the preference for democracy. Although the preference for democracy is high at the middle and highest levels of fractionalization, satisfaction is low at the same level. As previously argued, ethnic composition affects electoral competition, and two ethnic groups of equal size probably have the fiercest competition, which, in turn, lowers the satisfaction level. Note that the relationships are stronger when using level 15 fractionalization to predict preference for and satisfaction with democracy, indicating that perceived divisions at the finest level explain citizens' attitudes better than divisions at the lower level.

Alternatively, using religious fractionalization to represent social cleavages (Alesina et al., 2003), we obtain similar pictures. On average, levels of both preference for and satisfaction with democracy are higher in religiously heterogeneous societies than in homogenous societies. However, we also observed that the cleavage composition also matters. Although the high and low points differ in religious cleavages, they still indicate the same thing: a composition with a tendency to sharpen competition is more likely to have low satisfaction.

The investigations revealed that different levels of fragmentation affect citizens' preferences for and satisfaction with democracy differently. The overall trend illustrates that the more heterogeneous a society, the higher its levels of preference and satisfaction citizens have, societies with fractionalization at the middle level (i.e., two ethnic groups of roughly equal size) tend to have a higher level of preference but a lower level of satisfaction. This is because such a configuration induces polarization more easily than other compositions. Thus, aspirations for democracy might be high; however, in practice, it encounters the built-in paradox of democracy. Therefore, heterogeneous societies are not necessarily detrimental to democracy. The relationship is not linear, but U-shaped, as fractionalization at the middle level is more likely to trigger intense competition that lowers citizens' satisfaction with democracy. The next section examines whether the same logic applies to a partisan cleavage.

Partisan Cleavages and Anti-Party Sentiment

Party system institutionalization is expected to have a positive impact on democracy. One of the characteristics of institutionalization is the proportion of partisan identifiers in a polity: the more people identify with parties, the more representative a party system is in expressing citizens' concerns and interests.

The percentage of party identifiers is calculated from the question "Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?" and "If there is any party you feel closest to?" Across regions, the percentages of party identifiers are high in East Asia and Africa, but very low in the Arab world and Eurasia. This finding indicates that party systems in East Asia and Africa are more institutionalized than in other regions, according to the standard of party affiliation. Citizens in the two regions generally find expressions in parties.

Figure 9 illustrates the relationships between the percentage of party identifiers and preferences for and satisfaction with democracy. As we




Figure 8. Percent of Party identifiers across Regions




Figure 9. The Percentage of Party Identifiers and Preference for and Satisfaction with Democracy

can see, the percentage of party identifiers does not affect the preference for democracy, but it has a positive impact on the satisfaction level (lower panel). The more party identifiers there, the more people are satisfied with the democracy in that country. This indicates that party identity is important for democracy.

Another way to investigate whether an institutionalized party system is conducive to democracy is to examine the level of trust in political parties. Assuming that parties represent different social cleavages, as parties speak for the interests of social groups, we would expect trust in political parties to be high. As people trust parties, they should be more satisfied with democracy and prefer it over any other regime type. Trust in political parties is the percentage of respondents who gave a positive answer to the question “How much trust do you have in political parties?”. The trust levels in political parties are generally low across regions, with the highest median in Eurasia. The variation is largest in East Asia, where the lowest level is below 20% and the highest is above 70%. People in Latin America have the lowest levels of trust in political parties, indicating widespread antiparty sentiment in the region.

Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between trust in parties and democracy. It is clear that the more people trust parties, the more they prefer democracy to other types of regimes (upper panel). Similarly, a high level of trust is associated with high levels of satisfaction across countries. Political parties are important factors influencing citizens’ attitudes toward democracy.

Finally, as argued earlier, ethnolinguistic cleavages are not necessarily as detrimental to democracy as their composition is. Does this apply to a partisan cleavage? Partisan cleavage is measured as the discrepancy between the percentages of identifiers of the largest and second-largest parties. Suppose that a party system tends to have two major parties occupying the two sides of an ideological spectrum and that the difference in the number of supporters indicates the level of party system polarization. That is, if the discrepancy is large, it indicates that one major party has the dominant position. If the discrepancy is small, it means that the two major parties have almost equal numbers of supporters and, presumably, competition should be intense. Note that this is not a good proxy for party system polarization, as parties with ideological positions are not really measured, but assumed. Moreover, non-identifiers




Figure 10. Levels of Trust in Political Parties across Regions

are excluded from the calculation; therefore, if the anti-party sentiment is prevalent, it is meaningless to reflect partisan cleavages. Despite these shortcomings, we reversed the indicator to reflect the level of party system polarization, with a large number indicating high polarization owing to the intense competition between the two major parties.

Across the three regions, the polarization level is the highest in the Middle East and lowest in Africa. This is probably because of the many dominant parties on the African continent. East Asia has several predominant one-party systems. If party system polarization affects competition, we expect low polarization to be associated with positive attitudes toward democracy. Conversely, high polarization should lead citizens to negatively evaluate democracy.

Figure 13 illustrates the results of the investigation. Here, we can observe a similar trend in ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages. The impact of party system polarization on preference for democracy is small but its impact on satisfaction with democracy is significant. When the largest party is predominant, satisfaction levels tend to be high. However,




Figure 11. Trust in Political Parties and Preference for and Satisfaction with Democracy




Figure 12. Levels of Partisan Cleavages across Regions

when the polarization level is high, implying fierce competition, the satisfaction level is the lowest. These findings echo the earlier findings of this study.

Satisfaction with democracy is affected by cleavage structure. When a structure is likely to trigger intense competition, satisfaction levels are lowered. In other words, the number of cleavages is not the key factor affecting the prospect of democracy, but its composition is.

The findings clearly demonstrate that party system institutionalization affects how citizens view democracy. When there is a large proportion of party identifiers, citizens tend to be satisfied with democracy. Partisan cleavages, such as ethnic and religious divisions, also impact satisfaction with democracy. When party system polarization is high (i.e., the two major parties have almost an equal number of supporters), the satisfaction level tends to be low. This finding is consistent with those presented earlier. Competition is likely to be intense when two groups of equal size exist. In this situation, the satisfaction level decreases. Therefore, the configuration of ethnic and partisan divisions affects competition, which, in turn, affects citizens' evaluation of democracy. Finally, when citizens




Figure 13. Party System Polarization and Preference for and Satisfaction with Democracy

trust political parties, they are more stratified with democracy. This finding warns political parties. As trust in political parties is generally low compared to trust in all other political institutions, this anti-party sentiment will ultimately affect the future of democratic regimes.

Conclusion

This study investigates the relationship between social and partisan cleavages and democracy, arguing that social heterogeneity is not necessarily harmful to democracy. Conventional wisdom states that highly diverse societies pose obstacles to the survival of democracy, as antagonisms and conflicts are likely to get out of control when social divisions are politicized in electoral competitions. Thus, we expect social heterogeneity to be negatively associated with democracy. However, this study contends that the impact of social diversity on democracy is influenced by the composition of ethnic groups that affect electoral competition. When composition does not intensify electoral competition, social heterogeneity may contribute to democratic survival. Thus, democracy is likely to be sustained in societies with very low and high levels of ethnolinguistic and religious divisions. However, when there are two groups of approximately equal size, democracy is likely to be in peril because of political polarization. In other words, social cleavages have a U-shaped relationship with democracy, with positive effects on both ends and a negative effect in the middle.

Using GBS data from six regions, the findings show that satisfaction with democracy is high when ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalizations are either low or high. However, the satisfaction level tends to be low at the medium level of fractionalization. In terms of partisan cleavages, when the party system is polarized with two major parties of equal size, the satisfaction level also tends to be low. Satisfaction levels increase when a party dominates. All findings indicate that social and partisan cleavages do not necessarily negatively affect people's satisfaction with democracy, as the effect is mediated through how cleavages affect competition. It is only when the cleavage structure is likely to trigger fierce competition that cleavage negatively affects citizens' attitudes toward democracy.

Therefore, the findings imply that the composition of social and partisan cleavages is key to understanding their relationship with democracy. As the composition of cleavages affects electoral competition, it might trigger devastating conflicts that diminish democracy. Thus, policies and institutional designs should target a composition that has a high likelihood of intense competition among social groups, rather than social and partisan cleavages at large.

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社会和党派的分裂与民主的需求和供给

摘要：本研究探讨了社会和党派的分裂与民主的需求和供给之间的关系。与普遍观点不同，本研究认为社会异质性本身并不对民主有害。相反，社会多样性的影响会被种族和社会群体的组成结构所调节，这种组成结构影响着选举竞争的激烈程度。虽然高度同质和异质的社会往往对民主有较高的满意度，而群体分布大致均衡的社会则会经历激烈的竞争和对民主较低的满意度。本研究利用全球晴雨表调查(2010-2013年)中六个地区的数据，考察了民主偏好与满意度之间的关系，以及种族语言、宗教和党派分裂的情况。这些研究结果表明，分裂的组成结构(而非其单纯存在)是决定民主成功与否的关键因素。本研究强调了制度设计在管理选举竞争中的关键作用。

关键词：民主、社会分裂、民族冲突、政党体系、政治极化

사회·정당 분열 및 민주주의의 수요와 공급

초록 : 본 연구는 사회·정당 분열 및 민주주의의 수요와 공급 간 관계를 살펴 보았다. 본 연구에서는 일반적으로 생각하는 것과 다르게 사회적 이질성이 반드시 민주주의에 해로운 것은 아니라고 주장하였다. 그 대신 사회적 다양성의 영향은 선거 경쟁의 강도에 영향을 미치는 인종 및 사회 집단의 구성이 매개한다. 동질성이 높고 이질적인 사회의 경우 민주주의에 대한 만족도가 높은 경향이 있지만, 각 집단이 대략 고르게 분포된 사회의 경우 치열한 경쟁을 경험하며 만족도가 낮다. 이에 본 연구는 6개 지역의 GBS(Global Barometer Survey)(2010~2013년) 데이터를 이용하여 민주주의에 대한 선호도와 만족도 및 민족언어·종교·정당 분열 간 관계를 조사하였다. 본 연구 결과는 분열의 존재 여부가 아니라 분열의 구성이 민주주의 성공의 핵심 결정요인임을 보여준다. 또한 본 연구는 선거 경쟁을 관리함에 있어 제도적 설계의 역할이 중요함을 보여준다.

주요어 : 민주주의, 사회적 분열, 민족 갈등, 정당 시스템, 정치적 양극화

社会的・党派的亀裂と民主主義の需要と供給

概要：本研究では、社会的・党派的亀裂と民主主義の需要と供給の関係を調査する。通例に反し、本書は社会的異質性は民主主義にとって本質的に有害ではないと述べるものである。代わりに、社会的多様性の影響は、民族的・社会的集団の構成により仲介され、それが選挙競争の激しさに影響を及ぼす。同質性と異質性の高い社会は民主主義に対する満足度が高い傾向にあるが、集団がほぼ均等に分布する社会は激しい競争を経験し、満足度が低い。本研究では、6地域にわたるグローバル・パロメーター・サーベイ(2010年~2013年)のデータを用いて、民主主義に対する嗜好と満足度の関係を、民族言語学的・宗教的・党派的亀裂という視点と共に検証する。これらの知見は、単にその存在だけではなく、亀裂の構成が民主主義の成功を決定づける重要な要因であることを示唆している。本研究は、選挙競争を管理する上で制度設計が果たす重要な役割を強調している。

キーワード：民主主義、社会的亀裂、民族紛争、政党制、政治的二極化

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