

Shaping Demands for Government Redistribution in East Asia:

Cultural Values and Economic Factors

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Abstract: This study explores the influence of cultural values on public demand for redistribution in East Asia by comparing developed and developing contexts. Using data from the Asian Barometer Survey and following existing classifications of cultural dimensions—long-term expectations, collectivism, conflict avoidance, and orientation toward authority—we find that cultural values significantly shape redistribution preferences. The results indicate that long-term expectations and collectivism are positively associated with support for redistribution, especially in developing countries and regions where economic inequality is more pronounced. Conversely, attitudes toward authority have a minimal impact on redistribution demand. Our findings suggest that cultural values remain influential despite modernization, contributing to diverse welfare approaches across East Asia. This study highlights the significance of cultural factors in welfare policies, offering insights into how East Asian societies uniquely navigate welfare expansion amid economic growth and cultural continuity.

Keywords: Redistribution Preferences, Cultural Values, Welfare Policy, East Asia, and Economic Inequality

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Introduction

Economic crises and recessions made inequality one of the most important political issues in the new millennium's second decade. The severity of inequality and how governments address it have become central topics in the academic community (Piketty 2013; Boushey et al. 2017). As a direct approach to addressing inequality, "redistribution" and "welfare states" have consistently been linked to government intervention (Palme 2006; Esping-Andersen and Myles 2011; Caminada et al. 2012). Simultaneously, the expansion of state capacity for welfare and redistribution became widespread. Minimalist states (Chau and Yu 2005) are evolving into more extensive "welfare states" (Economist 2012). Additionally, amid the challenges of low fertility and an aging population, East Asia's most developed economies have evolved to take greater responsibility.

However, scholarly attention to East Asia's welfare transformation has been far less extensive than that of its Western counterparts. In instances where contributions exist (Walker and Wong 2005), they frequently begin with macro-level analyses, emphasizing structural impacts (Esping-Andersen 1990) and therefore lack individual-level perspectives. Why should we focus on individuals? If there is no demand, then there is no supply. Whether through regime legitimacy in autocracies or voter pressure in democracies, shifts in government policy respond to population demands. Consequently, a research agenda on "social policy preferences" (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001) has developed, centered around individuals' rational choices. These studies represent two of the three major research approaches to comparative politics: rational choice and structural analysis (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2009). However, culture remains an approach that has yet to be fully explored.

Compared with Western societies, East Asian societies are more collectivist and less individualistic, with welfare systems that are more family-based than occupation-based. Since the debates on "Asian Values" (Kim 1994; Zakaria and Lee 1994; Barr 2000), the influence of cultural legacies on political institutions in East Asia has garnered increased interest. How do these cultural legacies shape people's attitudes toward inequality and redistribution? This is the primary question this study

seeks to address.

This study aims to bridge the gap in the existing literature by extending individual-level analysis to East Asia and placing culture at the center of this analysis. The following section briefly reviews how economic factors influence people's demand for redistribution and the cultural theory of East Asian welfare states. The next section explores how cultural values shape this demand, along with our classifications and hypotheses. The third section presents the empirical tests and analyses. The final section discusses the interaction between micro-level cultural values and macro-level state welfare and the potential welfare transformations in East Asian societies.

Rationality, Structural, and Something in Between

It has been debated whether comparative politics exists within a “messy, eclectic center” (Kohli et al. 1995) or if there are, in fact, three major research approaches at the core of this discipline (Lichbach and Zuckerman 2009). The latter argument is more likely for studies that examine the development of welfare states and redistribution.

Rationality and Economic Factors

Comparativists construct micro-level models based on rational choice theory to explain why individuals lean toward redistribution, which results in welfare expansion. There are three main theoretical approaches to the study of individual social policy preferences: the distribution model (Meltzer and Richard 1981), the insurance model (Moene and Wallerstein 2001), and the asset model (Iversen and Soskice 2001). These theories are rooted in rational choice, with individuals as the units of analysis.

First, the traditional political-economic model proposed by Meltzer and Richard is based on the income gap between median voters and the average income. According to this model, an individual's preferred tax rate is negatively related to their income.

The insurance model posits that risk aversion influences an

individual's support for social policies. This model differs from the Meltzer-Richard model by arguing that higher-income individuals have a greater stake in the economy and, as a result, face greater risks. This increased risk makes them more risk-averse and, in turn, more supportive of social protection. Finally, in the asset model, an individual's skills' specificity (or lack thereof) can shape their attitudes toward redistribution.

These models demonstrate that income level, risk aversion, and skill specificity may be the most significant determinants of individuals' support for social programs. However, all these explanatory factors are economic. Each model assumes that people act rationally, weighing the costs and benefits of supporting a welfare state.

Structure, Culture, and "Welfare Regimes"

In contrast, the emphasis shifts from economic factors to structural elements when considering "welfare regimes" at the societal level. This shift began with Esping-Andersen's influential work, which popularized the term "welfare regime" (Esping-Andersen 1990). In his framework, class coalitions and political-economic structures determine the welfare regime matrix.

Beyond structural factors such as democratization and economic development (Holliday 2000; Aspalter 2006), culture also plays a crucial role. Welfare systems in East Asia have frequently been described as "Confucian welfare systems," which differ from their Western counterparts in three major ways. First, social welfare expenditures are lower than those in most Western countries, with spending concentrated primarily on education and healthcare. Second, welfare rights are not regulated by civil rights; rather, non-governmental organizations, communities, and families are expected to be the primary care providers. Finally, the Confucian welfare system employs "selective" social insurance, focusing on specific privileged social groups rather than adopting Western universalism or pay-as-you-go social insurance systems.

To explain these differences, certain scholars have emphasized the role of culture in shaping and developing welfare systems in East-Asian societies (Jones 1990; Walker and Wong 2005). Cultural values, particularly Confucian values, emphasize self-reliance, familial, and

communitarianism. Additionally, these values have been utilized by the ruling elites to encourage family or community members to voluntarily provide care, thereby avoiding increased government budgets and minimizing the adverse effects of pro-market economic policies. Cultural values are universally adaptable, enabling a selective interpretation that suits the needs of those in power. Since the colonial era, the Hong Kong government has promoted traditional values to limit social expenditure despite high inequality. Similarly, Communist Party leaders in China have built a “core value system” infused with traditional ethos, enthusiastically fostering a revival of “traditional Confucian values.” However, these movements also respond to social instability and contemporary issues, such as inequality and an aging population. In this context, cultural values serve to maintain political legitimacy and as a rationale for restricting welfare expansion.

The above discussion highlights the varying perspectives on forming welfare states and public attitudes toward redistribution. Evidently, there is a gap that needs to be addressed. The following section will explore how cultural values influence people’s attitudes toward redistribution.

Dimensions of Cultural Values and Demand for Redistribution

As mentioned above, “cultural values” is an “all-inclusive” concept, and the ambiguity of this term often causes confusion and complicates the development of meaningful theories. What does culture do? What are the essences of certain cultural values? To overcome this ambiguity and clarify the causal mechanisms through which culture influences support for the redistribution, we employ a classification method based on empirical testing and build our theories on this foundation.

Dimensionality of Cultural Values

Cultural values comprise a vast set of norms and codes that influence people’s interactions with markets, authorities, and others. Apart from serving as a contextual backdrop for decision-making, culture transcends rational calculations and shapes societal structures (North 1990). To

enable a deeper analysis, we must break culture down into distinct dimensions and examine how each affects the dependent variables.

Several theories concern the dimensionality of cultural values, particularly in the Asian context (Chang et al. 2005; Shin 2011; Shi 2014). However, these classifications are frequently overly general to clarify causal mechanisms (typically comprising only two dimensions) (Chang et al. 2005; Shi 2014) or extremely detailed for practical analysis (Hofstede 1984; Shin 2011). In contrast, Huang's innovative approach to cultural categorization (Huang and Chang 2017) introduces a new framework that distinguishes cultural values into four dimensions based on empirical testing using categorical IRT factor analysis.

The four dimensions are: "collectivism," "long-term expectations," "Confucianism cores," and "conflict avoidance." This classification not only strongly aligns with previous frameworks but also defines four primary types of interpersonal relationships. If culture and informal rules influence behavior (North 1990), they must first function as norms that define interactions within the "ingroup" (collectivism), with the "outgroup" (conflict avoidance), with authority and hierarchical order (Confucianism cores), and with institutions or third-party enforcement (long-term expectations). The following sections explore these dimensions and their relationships with democratic legitimacy.

Although we adopt Huang's classification framework, we do not entirely follow its terminology or rationale. For instance, with "Confucianism cores," we argue that such values are not necessarily exclusive to Confucianism. From West to East, the power dynamics between individuals and their parents, in-laws, or teachers reflect the broader societal power structures between rulers and the citizens. The more liberal and individualistic ethos prevalent in the US and UK educational systems, family life, and political environments is less common in France, Germany, and much of East Asia. For example, the strict classroom setting in France mirrors a power imbalance between the executive and legislative branches. In Islamic societies, the relationships among individuals, their elders, and teachers are hierarchical.

To avoid self-imposed constraints on the definition of the concept, we adopt Shih's concept of "orientation to authority" (OTA) (Shi 2014) in place of "Confucianism cores" to represent norms governing interactions with authorities and powerful figures. According to Shih's definition,

these relationships can be categorized as “reciprocal” or “deferential.” Under reciprocal OTA norms, relationships with authority figures are based on mutual consent, where one follows superior judgment out of reciprocal consideration. Conversely, deferential OTA norms require submission to a superior’s decision based on hierarchical social order. Since the latter captures the essence of submissiveness to hierarchy, we use the term “orientation to authority” to describe this cultural dimension throughout this article. Thus, we classify cultural values into four dimensions: “collectivism,” “long-term expectations,” “orientation to authority,” and “conflict avoidance.”

Cultural Values and Attitudes Toward Redistribution

To analyze the influence of each dimension of cultural values, we should examine how they are formed and what aspects of social life they define. Cultural values, acting as a “form of social solidarity,” must “underpin everyday reciprocities and relations” (Boyd and Walter 2012). However, what types of relationships influence the demand for redistribution? How do these relationships relate to the demand for redistribution? To our knowledge, the concepts that link these elements are “equality” and “social connection.”

If people view redistribution as a way of achieving social equality (Taylor-Gooby 1985), then “altruism” can be a motivating factor for supporting redistribution. Although pure altruism is rare, this motivation can be understood as individuals cooperating to maintain their reputation and dignity in a repeated-game context (Kreps et al. 1982). Furthermore, individuals prioritizing long-term relationships are more likely to consider others’ interests, as these relationships impact their future well-being. From this perspective, culture’s “long-term expectation” dimension directly reflects a tendency toward altruism.

Second, within “collectivism,” individuals may consider interests beyond their own. While the “collective” frequently includes oneself—resulting in altruism that may resemble self-interest—when collectives expand to larger groups, such as communities or nation-states, the concept of “collectivism” encourages perceiving equality within communities as socially desirable.

In contrast, “conflict avoidance” overlaps somewhat with “long-

term expectation”; however, it operates more passively, focusing on avoiding discord rather than actively sharing interests with others. Lastly, the dimension of “orientation toward authority” is less relevant to social connections, focusing instead on the norms and codes of hierarchical order. Thus, we anticipate the impact of cultural values on attitudes toward redistribution to follow, in descending order, long-term expectations, collectivism, conflict avoidance, and orientation toward authority.

From the perspective of “social connection,” the origin and sustainability of a social welfare regime are intricately linked to individuals’ identification with “citizenship” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Accordingly, we expect cultural values associated with social connections and identification with social groups to increase demand for redistribution. Based on this notion, “collectivism” and “long-term expectation” tend to exert the strongest influence, whereas “conflict avoidance” and “orientation toward authority” are expected to have weaker effects.

However, these proposed mechanisms may be conditioned by contextual factors. Cultural values evolve or weaken with economic and social development in both Western and Eastern societies (Inglehart 1997; Chang et al. 2005). This transformation helps to explain why studies of social policy preferences have higher validity in Western social contexts. Traditional collectives and social bonds are often challenged or replaced in societies characterized by complex divisions of labor and significant international trade. Consequently, once shaped by cultural values, social relationships may no longer be bound by these values. Therefore, we anticipate that in economically developed countries, the influence of cultural values on the demand for redistribution will be weaker than in developing countries.

Hypotheses

We can summarise our hypotheses as follows. First, considering the content of each dimension, the correlation between cultural values and demand for redistribution varies. “Long-term expectation” and “collectivism” are expected to have stronger positive effects on our dependent variable, whereas “conflict avoidance” and “orientation

toward authority” are anticipated to have weaker or no correlation with redistribution demands. Second, taking into account the effects of “modernisation,” the influence of cultural values on demand for redistribution is expected to be significantly lower in developed places.

We are now prepared to identify data sources to test these hypotheses.

Data and Variable Construction

Our study adopts Huang’s (Huang and Chang 2017) classification scheme, using data from the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Three reasons are identified for choosing the ABS. First, it encompasses all the cultural dimensions discussed in the previous section. Second, although we could not obtain the most recent wave of the ABS, its latest wave¹ includes items that assess public attitudes toward equality and redistribution. The third and most significant reason is that the ABS offers comparative cross-national data across diverse economic, political, ethnic, and cultural contexts. This diversity allows us to control for structural-level variables and focus on the relationship between cultural values and support for democracy.

Tables 1– to 4 provide details on the variable construction and operationalization.

Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we use logit models to estimate the regression coefficients. We conducted pooled and society-specific regressions to examine the relationship between cultural values and support for redistribution support. Using pooled but grouped regression, we retained the benefits of a large *N*, which allowed us to differentiate the influence of developmental levels. Additionally, to

Table 1. DV: Support for Redistribution

Questionnaire	Coding/Scale
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences between people with high income and those with low incomes.”	<i>Agree/Disagree</i> code as 1, else code as 0 (Binary)

Table 2. Cultural Values (and Dimensions)

Variables	Questionnaire/Coding	Scale
Orientation to Authority	Factor score of the following items: (Recode to 0/1) 60 Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask. 61 When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother. 62 Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher.	Continuous (-1.134,1.348)
Avoid Conflict	Factor score of the following items: (Recode to 0/1) 63 In a group, we should avoid open quarrels to preserve harmony. 64 Even if there is some disagreement, one should avoid the conflict. 65 A person should not insist on his opinion if his co-workers disagree.	Continuous (-1.709,0.953)
Collectivism	Factor score of the following items: (Recode to 0/1) 55 The individual should put his personal interests second for the family's sake. 56 In a group, we should sacrifice our interests for the collective interest. 57 For the sake of national interest, individual interest should be sacrificed.	Continuous (-2.450,0.850)
Long-term Expectation	Factor score of the following items: (Recode to 0/1) 58 Developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one's immediate interest when dealing with others. 59 When dealing with others, one should focus on immediate interest and plan for the future. 68 When dealing with others, one should not be preoccupied with temporary gains and losses.	Continuous (-3.087,0.641)

control for macro-level variances and account for small N in each society, we performed society-wise regressions to verify whether these effects hold across different societies. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variables across the surveyed societies. As shown, a substantial proportion of respondents in almost all the surveyed societies expressed a demand for redistribution. This suggests there may be some inefficiency in our model estimations.

Regarding the “developed/developing” distinction, Figure 2 reveals a long tail in the economic development levels of surveyed societies, easily dividing them into two groups: developed and developing. Taiwan,

Table 3. Inequality Assessment, Economic Endowment & Control Variables

Variables	Questionnaire/Coding	Scale
<i>Inequality Assessment</i>		
1	How fair do you think income distribution is in (country)? (Very) Unfair = 1, else = 0	
2	Considering all the effort that you and your family members have made in the past, do you think the income that your family currently receives is fair or not fair? (Very) Unfair = 1, else = 0	Binary
3	As compared to my parent's generation, my generation has more or fewer opportunities to improve one's standard of living or social status? (Substantially) Fewer = 1, else = 0	
<i>Economic Endowment</i>		
Income level	SE13a: Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? 4 = highest and 1 = lowest	4-point Likert
Lose income	If you were unfortunate enough to lose your main source of income, how serious would it be for you and your family?	Binary
Economic evaluation	How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? (1,2 good) = 1, (3 so so) = 0, (4,5 bad) = -1	(-1, 0, 1)
Unemployment	Breadwinner unemployment = 1 else = 0	Binary
<i>Control VBs</i>		
Male	SE2 Gender: (1=1), (2=0)	Binary
Education level	SE5: (elementary = 1), (mid-school = 2), (university and more = 3)	(1,2,3)
Generation	SE3: (18-35 = 1), (36-55 = 2), (56up = 3)	(1,2,3)
Urban Residence	level3: (Urban = 1)(Rural = 0)	Binary

South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore fall into the developed category, whereas the remaining societies fall under the developing category. Using a GDP per capita threshold of US\$10,000, we divided East Asian societies into these two groups and pooled the samples to




Figure 1. Economic Development Level in Covered East Asia Societies

perform two distinct regression models.

Empirical Analyses

Figure 3 presents the regression coefficients from the two logit models: blue markers represent samples from developed societies, whereas red markers represent samples from developing societies.²

The results indicate that the coefficients for the “inequality assessment” and “economic endowment” variables are inconsistent and primarily non-significant. However, coefficients for “cultural values” show highly consistent results. Importantly, these effects followed an ascending sequence and were statistically significant in the developing regions.

This finding merits further investigation. First, in the “inequality assessment” section, it appears that citizens across different levels of economic development perceive government redistribution in contrasting ways. In developed economies, people are more likely to support redistribution if they perceive the current income distribution or generational income gaps as unfair, as reflected by the positive correlation





Figure 2. Economic Development Level in East Asia Societies

between these two variables and the demand for redistribution. By contrast, in East Asia’s “liberal economies,” where capitalism is the dominant economic paradigm, imbalances between effort and returns are expected to be addressed through increased individual effort rather than redistribution. Conversely, in developing East Asia economies—with China being a notable example—when individuals perceive inequality or generational unfairness as issues, they are more likely to expect the government to implement developmental policies rather than redistributive ones (Whyte, 2010). From this perspective, the regression results appear logical.

The “economic endowment” variables present interesting findings: all related variables are non-significant in developed societies. This may be because, in these societies, most people already “have enough income” and are not “unemployed,” and perceive income distribution as relatively fair. Thus, economic concerns do not strongly drive demand for redistribution. In contrast, developing East Asian societies experience greater income inequality, higher unemployment rates, and lower living standards. Therefore, citizens in developing societies are more sensitive to tangible economic issues, while those with lower economic endowments are more likely to favor government redistribution.



Source: Asian Barometer Survey Wave 4
(Effects of Control Variables not Shown)

Figure 3. Pooled Logistic Regression Model

In the “cultural values” section, the results align with our hypotheses. the effects of cultural values are much weaker in developed societies than in their developing counterparts. In developing societies, cultural values have a significant effect and follow the descending order of “long-term expectation,” “collectivism,” “conflict avoidance,” and “orientation toward authority”—although these effects do not significantly differ from each other another. Additionally, in developing societies, these cultural values are significantly and positively correlated with the demand for redistribution. Cultural values play a crucial role in shaping redistribution preferences in developing countries.

To further examine the effect of cultural values, we conducted society-specific regressions. The results are presented in Table 4, and the effects of cultural values are summarized in Table 5. First, we discuss economic and inequality assessment variables. Among developed societies, individuals who perceive income distribution as highly unequal in Japan and Taiwan are more likely to support government redistribution. In Taiwan—and especially in Hong Kong—generational issues, such as “generation deprivation,” have emerged as a significant political conflict, influencing attitudes towards redistribution. By contrast,

Table 4. Societyspecific logistics regression model

	(1) JP	(2) HK	(3) KR	(4) CN	(5) MN	(6) PH	(7) TW
Unfair Income Dist.	1.025*** (4.08)	0.258 (0.91)	0.324 (1.66)	0.262* (2.35)	0.481* (2.01)	-0.658*** (-4.47)	0.454* (2.26)
Unfair Income/ Effort	0.677* (2.40)	-0.226 (-0.75)	-0.742*** (-3.98)	0.125 (0.98)	-0.271 (-1.30)	0.101 (0.46)	0.101 (0.52)
Generational Unfairness	0.236 (0.98)	1.024*** (3.76)	0.137 (0.80)	-0.0322 (-0.15)	0.368 (1.47)	-0.656*** (-5.00)	0.368* (2.01)
Enough Income	-0.174 (-0.91)	0.267 (1.03)	0.0931 (0.75)	-0.201* (-2.57)	-0.344* (-2.04)	0.0263 (0.27)	0.140 (0.98)
Losing Income Serious	0.247 (0.98)	0.234 (0.71)	0.471** (2.73)	0.217 (1.86)	0.688** (3.06)	0.247 (1.70)	-0.0610 (-0.33)
Negative Eco. Evaluation	-0.171 (-0.46)	0.0105 (0.03)	-0.0283 (-0.16)	0.0436 (0.29)	-0.251 (-0.89)	0.331 (1.58)	0.457 (1.75)
Unemployment	0.0397 (0.12)	-# -	- -	- -	- -	-0.131 (-0.53)	-0.358 (-1.32)
Confucian Cores	0.288 (1.32)	0.0294 (0.15)	-0.356** (-2.94)	0.302*** (3.98)	0.241 (1.65)	0.0652 (0.72)	-0.137 (-1.16)
Conflict Avoidance	0.206 (1.75)	-0.0256 (-0.19)	-0.000836 (-0.01)	0.176* (2.03)	0.00203 (0.01)	0.355*** (3.60)	0.0676 (0.74)
Collectivism	0.252 (1.90)	0.0537 (0.39)	0.153 (1.61)	0.204** (3.24)	0.225 (1.86)	0.0832 (1.00)	0.0268 (0.27)
Long-term Expect.	0.220 (1.34)	0.465*** (3.56)	0.178* (2.16)	0.285*** (3.35)	0.259* (2.03)	0.224** (2.81)	0.310* (2.46)
Male	-0.545* (-2.21)	-0.163 (-0.63)	-0.0856 (-0.52)	-0.259* (-2.47)	0.125 (0.61)	-0.0170 (-0.13)	0.0437 (0.27)
College Grad	0.0544 (0.22)	-0.300 (-0.84)	0.112 (0.56)	0.184 (1.47)	0.129 (0.59)	-0.0231 (-0.15)	0.195 (0.95)
Urban Resident	0.205 (0.46)	- -	-0.127 (-0.45)	0.266* (2.28)	0.0717 (0.29)	0.0460 (0.34)	0.134 (0.70)
Age Group	0.264** (2.95)	0.0571 (0.63)	0.0265 (0.39)	0.188*** (5.00)	0.100 (1.29)	0.0268 (0.59)	0.251*** (3.65)
Constant	-0.0791 (-0.11)	1.383** (2.68)	1.433** (3.20)	0.569** (2.92)	1.316*** (3.41)	1.044*** (4.70)	0.00766 (0.02)
Observations	508	719	1067	2235	993	1092	1276

Table 4 (Continued). Society Specific Logistic Regression Model

	(8) TH	(9) IN	(10) SG	(11) VN	(12) KH	(13) MY	(14) MM
Unfair Income Dist.	-0.483* (-2.12)	-0.177 (-0.73)	-0.0492 (-0.15)	-0.669** (-2.71)	-0.420* (-2.56)	-0.493* (-2.57)	-0.733 (-1.76)
Unfair Income/ Effort	-1.011 (-1.87)	-0.0500 (-0.19)	-0.388 (-0.66)	-0.300 (-0.99)	-0.164 (-0.97)	-0.177 (-0.82)	-0.483 (-1.60)
Generational Unfairness	-0.340 (-1.37)	-0.157 (-0.64)	-0.245 (-0.75)	-0.469 (-1.69)	0.0252 (0.14)	-0.271 (-1.46)	0.225 (0.67)
Enough Income	-0.0371 (-0.20)	-0.304* (-1.99)	0.289 (1.31)	-0.152 (-0.83)	-0.140 (-1.37)	0.0543 (0.44)	0.0424 (0.22)
Losing Income Serious	0.203 (0.88)	0.311 (1.30)	-0.101 (-0.31)	0.0744 (0.29)	0.128 (0.78)	-0.0666 (-0.37)	0.153 (0.60)
Negative Eco. Evaluation	-0.0598 (-0.20)	-0.182 (-0.60)	0.214 (0.35)	0.188 (0.18)	0.400 (1.81)	-0.0661 (-0.23)	0.0520 (0.15)
Unemployment	0.310 (0.72)	-0.0189 (-0.05)	0.00779 (0.02)	-0.302 (-0.47)	-0.440 (-0.37)	- -	0.340 (0.70)
Confucian Cores	0.0754 (0.54)	-0.268 (-1.34)	0.379 (1.73)	-0.194 (-1.23)	0.109 (1.02)	-0.0170 (-0.13)	0.226 (1.28)
Conflict Avoidance	-0.00936 (-0.07)	0.687** (3.20)	0.210 (1.38)	0.321 (1.70)	0.0276 (0.17)	0.371** (3.19)	0.0927 (0.34)
Collectivism	0.323 (1.59)	0.305* (2.16)	-0.163 (-0.78)	0.379 (1.62)	0.135 (1.57)	0.151 (1.35)	0.581*** (4.08)
Long-term Expect.	0.452** (3.22)	0.221 (1.28)	0.249 (1.44)	0.250 (1.31)	0.251** (2.67)	0.293** (2.67)	-0.251 (-0.82)
Male	-0.0699 (-0.32)	0.258 (1.15)	0.157 (0.54)	-0.268 (-1.13)	0.0103 (0.07)	-0.530** (-2.91)	-0.393 (-1.60)
College Grad	-0.488 (-1.65)	-0.0051 (-0.01)	0.524 (1.56)	-0.0701 (-0.22)	0.967 (1.91)	0.233 (0.93)	-0.224 (-0.67)
Urban Resident	0.662* (2.04)	0.222 (0.93)	0 (.)	-0.446 (-1.79)	0.125 (0.59)	0.131 (0.73)	0.0899 (0.33)
Age Group	0.164 (1.76)	0.133 (1.53)	-0.120 (-1.00)	0.148 (1.36)	0.136* (2.31)	0.0360 (0.59)	0.102 (1.01)
Constant	1.686*** (4.16)	1.891*** (5.03)	2.518*** (4.60)	2.784*** (6.85)	1.046*** (4.16)	2.157*** (6.72)	3.026*** (5.50)
Observations	811	1008	650	1033	988	1012	1170

t statistics in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

This denotes a variable that is absent in this society.

Table 5. Effect of Cultural Values in Surveyed societies

Societies	Long-term Expect.	Collectivism	Conflict Avoidance	OTAs
JP				
KR	+*			-**
TW	+*			
SG				
HK	+***			
MY	***		***	
CN	***	***	***	***
TH	***			
MN	+*			
IN	+*	***		
PH	***		***	
VN				
MM		***		
KH	**			

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

in most developing societies, except China and neighboring Mongolia, individuals with negative assessments of income distribution tend to support less government redistribution. These findings raise critical questions for further exploration.

Regarding economic endowment, income issues appear significant in Korea, China, Mongolia, and Indonesia. However, the absence of employment data limits our ability to fully investigate economic endowment variables.

To enhance clarity, we have summarized the results in Table 5, which lists all the surveyed societies and the four dimensions of cultural values, showing only each variable's direction and significance of each variable.

The results are precise: culture significantly influences the demand

for redistribution, particularly in aspects related to long-term relationships with others. This effect is evident in both developing and developed parts of East Asia. Additionally, two other dimensions—conflict avoidance and collectivism—impact individuals' demand for redistribution. In contrast, attitudes toward authority have minimal influence on shaping the demand for redistribution.

Conclusion: Culture Values in Transforming East Asia

This study's findings underscore that existing cultural values significantly influence public attitudes toward government redistribution in developing societies. However, it is not simply "culture" in a broad sense that matters. Ultimately, redistribution is a mechanism for promoting social equality, and the consideration of society as an interconnected whole is essential. When cultural factors—such as those discussed in this article—encourage citizens to be mindful of the well-being of others, the shared bonds that connect individuals can be key to fostering an increasingly equal society (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).

This study highlights several important patterns in how cultural values influence the demand for redistribution. First, we found that cultural dimensions associated with long-term relationships—termed "long-term expectation"—exert the most robust influence on redistribution demand, followed by collectivism and conflict avoidance. These dimensions create a framework through which individuals perceive redistribution as an economic policy and a socially cohesive practice. Conversely, attitudes toward authority have a minimal effect on redistribution demands, indicating that hierarchical norms are not central to shaping views on social equality.

Additionally, our analysis reveals the complex ways these cultural values operate in various contexts. In developed East Asian societies, factors such as income inequality and generational issues shape attitudes toward redistribution in alignment with established welfare models. In developing East Asian societies, where economic disparities are more pronounced, cultural values play an even more influential role in shaping redistribution preferences. This underscores the fact that cultural legacies

remain influential, even amid economic development and modernization, offering insights into how welfare policies evolve across different contexts.

Furthermore, our findings contribute to a broader understanding of how culture can stabilize or transform societies that are undergoing economic and social change. Different cultural frameworks within a society foster unique “social imaginaries” (Taylor 2003), yielding “varieties of welfare capitalism.” In the ongoing “great transformation” of East Asian welfare regimes, Western models may serve as aspirational templates. However, the influence of deeply embedded cultural values cannot be ignored. Even after years of modernization, cultural legacies persist, influencing the distinct pathways East Asian societies take in expanding welfare programs and redistribution policies.

In summary, we provide empirical evidence that individual-level cultural factors influence the equilibrium between social interactions and attitudes toward redistribution. By exploring the intersection of culture and policy, this study offers insights into the forces driving welfare transformation in East Asia. It provides a valuable perspective for understanding the limitations and possibilities of future welfare reforms in culturally diverse settings.

Notes

- 1 Conducted from 2013 to 2015; detailed timetable available on the website of Asian Barometer Survey.
- 2 To focus on testing the hypotheses in this paper, coefficients for control variables are omitted in the coefficient plot.

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东亚社会对政府再分配的需求形塑： 文化价值观与经济因素

摘要：本研究通过比较发达和发展中国家的背景，探讨了文化价值观对东亚公众对财富再分配需求的影响。利用亚洲晴雨表调查的数据以及以下现有的文化维度分类，即：长远预期、集体主义、回避冲突和权威取向，我们发现文化价值观显著塑造了人们对财富再分配的偏好。结果表明，长远预期和集体主义与支持财富再分配呈正相关，特别是在经济不平等更为突出的发展中国家和地区。相反，对权威的态度对再分配需求的影响微乎其微。我们的研究结果表明，尽管现代化进程不断推进，但文化价值观仍然具有影响力，促使东亚地区形成了不同的福利政策路径。本研究强调了文化因素在福利政策中的重要性，为东亚社会在经济增长和文化延续的特殊背景下，如何推进福利扩张提供了见解。

关键词：再分配偏好、文化价值观、福利政策、东亚、经济不平等

동아시아 정부 재분배에 대한 요구 형성: 문화적 가치와 경제적 요인

초록: 본 연구는 선진국과 개도국의 맥락을 비교하여 동아시아에서 문화적 가치가 부의 재분배에 대한 국민적 요구에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 아시아 바로미터 조사(Asian Barometer Survey) 데이터와 장기적 기대, 집단주의, 갈등 회피, 권위 지향 등 기존 문화적 차원 분류를 사용하여 문화적 가치가 재분배 선호에 미치는 영향이 크다는 점을 알게 되었다. 연구 결과 장기적 기대 및 집단주의는 특히 경제적 불평등이 상대적으로 확연한 개발국과 해당 지역에서 부의 재분배에 대한 지지와 정(+)적인 연관이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이에 비해 권위에 대한 태도는 재분배 요구에 미치는 영향이 미미하였다. 연구 결과 문화적 가치는 현대화에도 불구하고 여전히 영향이 있었으며, 동아시아 전반적으로 여러 복지 접근법에 영향을 미치고 있었다. 본 연구는 복지 정책에서 문화적 요인이 중요하다는 점을 부각하였으며, 동아시아 사회가 경제 성장과 문화적 연속성 속에서 자신만의 방식으로 어떻게 복지의 확대를 모색하고 있는지 보여준다.

핵심어: 재분배 선호, 문화적 가치, 복지 정책, 동아시아, 경제적 불평등

東アジアにおける政府の再分配に対する要求の形成: 文化的価値観と経済的要因

要旨: 本研究では、先進国と発展途上国の文脈を比較することで、東アジアにおける富の再分配を求める国民の声に対する文化的価値観の影響を探る。アジア・バロメーター調査のデータと、既存の文化的次元の分類である長期的期待、集団主義、葛藤回避、権力志向を用いて、文化的価値観が再分配選好を有意に形成していることを明らかにした。結果からは、長期的期待と集団主義が、特に発展途上国や経済的不平等が顕著である地域において富の再分配の支持と正の関係性にあることが示された。逆に、権力に対する態度は再分配の要求にほとんど影響しなかった。筆者らが得た結果は、現代化が進んでいるにもかかわらず文化的価値観が影響力を持ち続けており、東アジア各地における多様な福祉アプローチに貢献していることを示唆している。本研究は福祉政策における文化的要因の重要性を浮き彫りにし、経済成長や文化低継続性の中での福祉の拡大に向けた東アジアの諸社会の独特な在り方について洞察を提供している。

キーワード: 再分配の選好、文化的価値観、福祉政策、東アジア、経済的不平等

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