

Perceptions of China in South Korean Broadcast Media:

Bifurcated Frames of Politics and Economy

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Abstract: This study analyzes how the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” frame is reproduced in actual broadcast news in South Korea. Using big data on China-related political and economic news aired between 2012 and 2023 by South Korea’s major broadcasters, this study conducted network analyses of news sources and keywords. The results reveal that South Korean media coverage in China exhibits a dual perceptual structure, starkly separated across the political and economic domains. Political reporting relied on limited official channels, and security conflicts dominated. Economic reporting draws on diverse sources and focuses on market- and industry-specific keywords. A distinct “Economy with China” frame emerged, recognizing China as an irreplaceable partner and a key structural variable for the South Korean economy. The study empirically demonstrated that South Korean broadcasters reproduce structural contradictions by defining China as a security threat and an economic partner.

Keywords: ROK-China Relations, Security with the U.S., Economy with China, News Frame Analysis, Source Analysis, News Big Data Analysis

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Introduction

South Korea and China are neighboring nations that maintain close ties across various dimensions, including politics, society, economy, and culture. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992, China has been South Korea's largest trading partner for over two decades. Meanwhile, South Korea has been China's third-largest trading partner, facilitating mutual economic growth. However, as an ally of the U.S., South Korea relies significantly on the U.S. for its national security. Consequently, the concept of "Security with the U.S., Economy with China" has long served as a defining keyword for South Korea's diplomatic strategy. Nevertheless, political and security issues have emerged as critical concerns within South Korean society due to a series of geopolitical developments, including the strengthening of China's military capabilities, the advancement of North Korea's nuclear program, the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and the intensification of the US–China trade dispute. In this context, analyzing how South Korea perceives its relationship with China and examining the shifts in societal perception provide a crucial foundation for understanding future bilateral relations and resolving potential conflicts.

Among the diverse methods employed to analyze bilateral relations, international news offers a unique window into how one nation perceives another. Although news reporting aims to cover events objectively, it is influenced by reporters' cognitive biases, their role perceptions, and the constraints of domestic media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Research suggests that when domestic interests are at stake, international news coverage is heavily conditioned by "national frames" (Nossek, 2004). During diplomatic crises, the media tends to accentuate conflicts, often adopting strong watchdog and interventionist roles to defend national interests. Consequently, an analysis of South Korean news reports on China serves as a crucial indicator of Seoul's perception of Beijing and the future trajectory of the relationship.

This research analyzes 24,637 political and economic news reports related to China broadcast between 2012 and 2023 by South Korea's major broadcasters (KBS, MBC, and SBS) and the 24-hour

news channel YTN. Specifically, this research investigates which news sources and keywords were employed in China-related political and economic coverage and examines the distinct differences between the two categories. Furthermore, the study explores how news coverage has evolved in response to recent shifts in South Korea-China relations.

The analysis revealed significant disparities in news sources and keywords between the political and economic domains, indicating that South Korea maintains a dichotomous perception structure regarding China. Political coverage reinforced the “Security with the U.S.” frame, viewing China through the lens of the U.S.-centric security alliance. Conversely, economic coverage exhibited a strong “Economy with China” frame, perceiving China as a cooperative partner within a China-centric market and industrial structure. However, recent findings suggest a shift in economic reporting: amid the U.S.-China trade dispute and China’s technological catch-up, China is increasingly perceived as a competitive partner.

The Role of Journalists and Framing Effects in International News Reporting

International news serves as a key source of information that determines which nations are important to the public and which issues they should consider (Wanta et al., 2004). However, in actual reporting, there is a tendency to focus on events in neighboring countries due to geographic proximity rather than covering the globe in a balanced manner (Aalberg et al., 2013). The selection and presentation of international news are influenced more significantly by “national frames,” such as national interests, than by the professionalism of reporters or editors (Nossek, 2004). Studies have reported that events involving domestic security or economic interests tend to be covered in an emotional and biased manner, whereas events unrelated to national interests are reported in a relatively neutral and fact-oriented manner (Aalberg et al., 2013; Nossek, 2004). Regarding the coverage of North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the media in South Korea, China, and the U.S. displayed a mixture of global and state-centric perspectives. The findings indicate that these media outlets constructed causes, moral judgments, and solutions

to the event in alignment with their respective government policies and interests (Dai & Hyun, 2010). This phenomenon is explained by the fact that media organizations and journalists operate within socio-political environments and institutional structures, which continuously influence them (Shoemaker, 1991; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

In the process of selecting, emphasizing, and excluding specific aspects of reality, the media inevitably constructs specific interpretive frames (Entman, 1993). Galtung and Ruge (1965) posited that international news is inherently conflict-oriented and that the media can either exacerbate or mitigate conflict through war and peace frames. Subsequent studies have provided empirical evidence that readers exposed to peace journalism are more likely to support nonviolent conflict resolution (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2013; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2016). Ha et al. (2022) demonstrated that perceptions of news coverage regarding the U.S.–China trade dispute significantly influence the formation of public attitudes among U.S. citizens. Citizens who perceived the coverage as emphasizing peaceful relations showed increased affinity toward China, whereas those who recognized the warframe exhibited higher support for the U.S. government's hardline policies.

Journalists' role perceptions also significantly influence the selection and production of news topics. Early research identified media functions within diplomatic contexts by distinguishing between the roles of the "neutral reporter" and the "participant" (Cohen, 1963). Subsequently, Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) expanded this typology into four categories: interpretive, disseminator, adversarial, and populist mobilizer. Building on this, Hanitzsch et al. (2019) proposed a classification of monitorial, collaborative, interventionist, and accommodative roles based on dimensions such as the degree of intervention in state affairs, distance from power, and market orientation. Such role perceptions are shaped by a nation's political and cultural environment (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996; Hantrais, 1999). For instance, while covering the COVID-19 pandemic, South Korean journalists exhibited a strong watchdog role regarding the government and a marked interventionist tendency to participate in the resolution of social problems (Chen & Koo, 2022).

As a divided nation, South Korea is at the forefront of the North Korean nuclear threat and hegemonic competition in East Asia. This

geopolitical environment serves as a critical factor that renders South Korean society highly sensitive to politics and predisposes it to view international politics primarily through a conflict-centered lens. In democratic nations, the media, functioning as the “Fourth Estate,” plays a role in monitoring the government and seeking to resolve social issues. These characteristics are expected to be more pronounced in South Korea. Therefore, analyzing how South Korean media reports on China serves as a method to indirectly gauge South Korea’s strategic stance toward China. Accordingly, this study analyzes the distinct differences between political and economic news coverage regarding China.

Political and Security Conflict and Economic Interdependence between South Korea and China

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992, South Korea and China have maintained amicable relations as cooperative partners. However, fundamental tensions have remained inherent in the political and security realms because of issues involving North Korea’s nuclear tests and South Korea-U.S. alliance. According to early studies, until the early 2000s, South Korea even displayed a more favorable attitude toward China than the U.S. while pursuing its Engagement Policy toward North Korea (Chung, J., 2005). In the economic sphere, the two nations share close ties. Bilateral relations peaked in 2015, marked by former President Park Geun-hye’s attendance at China’s Victory Day parade and the entry into force of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Consequently, “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” became a defining framework for explaining South Korea’s political and economic dynamics.

However, a series of events since 2010 has led South Korean society to perceive China as a potential threat and an object of distrust. In the wake of the Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the South Korean people expected China to act as a mediator befitting a responsible great power. Instead, China caused profound disappointment in South Korean society by merely emphasizing a principled and peaceful resolution (Lee & Hao, 2018). A clear divergence in perspectives has also emerged regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. While South Korea

perceives it as an existential threat where national survival is at stake, China approaches the matter from the perspective of regional stability management (Snyder & Byun, 2016).

In particular, the conflict surrounding the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system demonstrates that security issues have emerged as the paramount variable in bilateral relations. Following the THAAD crisis, anti-China sentiments gradually expanded among the South Korean public, regardless of conservative or progressive political orientations. As security anxiety intensified, both South Korea's foreign policy and public opinion tended to strengthen support for a US-centric security alliance (Song, 2023; Kim, S., 2025). This constitutes the structural context in which political news inevitably frames China through conflict and threats.

Despite the political conflict, China, South Korea's largest trading partner, served as the driving force behind the early bilateral economic relationship. Research grounded in the theory of economic interdependence and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that groups that benefit from trade (specifically, high-skilled, capital-intensive industries) tend to harbor relatively favorable perceptions of China (Chung, 2015). In essence, according to economic logic, China was highly likely to be perceived not as a threat but as a land of opportunity and a source of benefits.

However, recent studies indicate a perceptible shift in perception within the economic domain (Kim et al., 2017; Song, 2023; Lee & Hao, 2018; Snyder & Byun, 2016). First, China's economic retaliation during the THAAD dispute imprinted on South Korean society the realization that high economic interdependence could, conversely, function as economic coercion or a weapon (Lee & Hao, 2018). Second, China's economic growth and technological catch-up have transformed its bilateral relationship from complementary to competitive. Intensified competition in flagship industries such as smartphones and semiconductors, coupled with declining exports to China, has diminished economic opportunities (Snyder & Byun, 2016). Therefore, while positive perspectives emphasizing robust exports and market expansion previously dominated the discourse on economic relations, it is suggested that risk-centric frames such as economic retaliation and technological competition are now increasingly intermixed.

It is increasingly probable that the paradigm of “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” which has long defined the bilateral relationship, is losing its validity. Recent research indicates that economic interdependence and cultural affinity cannot adequately counterbalance security insecurities and identity threats (Jung & Jeong, 2016; Koo, 2025). Indeed, studies argue that security disputes—namely, the THAAD crisis and North Korean nuclear threats—have spilled over into the economic realm through retaliation, creating a dynamic in which political imperatives overshadow economic perceptions (Kim et al., 2017). Consequently, this suggests a shift in news media: the traditional distinction between political conflict frames and economic pragmatic frames is likely collapsing, leading to significant overlap or convergence toward a predominantly negative trajectory.

Research Method and Data

This study examines the characteristics of China-related coverage in South Korean broadcasting by analyzing political and economic news based on sources and quoted keywords categorized by year and sector. Specifically, this study analyzes news sources to identify the dominant sources leading to discourse on China by period and field. Furthermore, by analyzing keywords in quotes from these sources, this study seeks to uncover the central agenda of the political and economic discourse on China. The analysis focuses on political and economic reporting by South Korea’s major terrestrial broadcasters (KBS, MBC, and SBS) and an all-news channel (YTN). The research questions proposed in this study were as follows:

Research question 1: Which information sources are utilized in South Korean broadcast news reports concerning Chinese politics and economics?

Research question 2: What is the composition of keywords found in the quotations of China-related political and economic news reports?

Research question 3: Are there observable shifts in the recent trajectory of South Korean broadcast coverage regarding Chinese politics and economics?

News big data analyses are primarily conducted using Natural Language Processing (NLP). The data for this NLP analysis were collected using BIGKinds, a news database managed by the Korea Press Foundation. BIGKinds provides information sources, direct quotations, quotation keywords, and relevant metadata using advanced NLP functions, such as Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Topic Modeling. Three representative keywords were selected and analyzed for each source and quotation.

Semantic network analysis employs both news source and keyword network analyses (Park, et al., 2025; Park et al. 2024; Park & Lee, 2022). In news-source network analysis, information sources function as nodes, whereas edges are established based on their co-occurrence within an article. Conversely, in the news keyword network analysis, keywords found in quotations serve as nodes, with edges formed by their co-occurrence within quotations. Within each network, the importance of a node is measured by degree centrality, and the significance of a link is determined by tie strength (calculated via co-occurrence frequency), which is utilized for ranking purposes. Accordingly, in the news source network, key sources are identified as central figures (or controversial sources) who possess a high number of unique co-cited sources. In a news keyword network, primary keywords are those associated with numerous related keywords, indicating multifaceted topics discussed from various perspectives.

China-related news reports were searched using the search keyword “China.” The scope of data collection spanned the 12 years from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2023. The analysis was limited to news reports, sources, and keywords quoted in broadcasts by South Korean media. In this study, articles were included in the analysis of whether Politics or Economy appeared within their top three classification categories. The dataset for China-related political news comprised 16,639 reports (duplicates removed), yielding 43,558 quotations and 34,791 keywords. Regarding economic news, a total of 7,998 reports (duplicates removed) were collected, comprising 17,214 quotations and 19,404 keywords.

From 2012 to 2023, the volume of political news coverage in China generally maintained an annual average of 1,000 to 1,500 articles, indicating that the South Korean media has paid continuous attention to China’s political sphere. The number of articles peaked at 2,149 in 2012,




Figure 1. Trends in the number of political and economic news articles and quotes related to China, 2012-2023

a significant year marked by a change in the government. Since then, the volume has fluctuated, yet a tendency toward short-term spikes has been observed in years when specific events or political issues are prominent. For instance, coverage surged to over 2,000 articles in 2014 when President Xi Jinping visited South Korea for the first time after taking office. Similarly, relatively high levels were maintained during the peak of the THAAD deployment conflict, with 1,811 articles in 2017 and 1,455 in 2018. Although the numbers decreased to 905 in 2020 and 945 in 2021 with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, they rebounded to 1,234 in 2022 and 1,444 in 2023 as China's COVID policies shifted and the "post-COVID" era emerged.

Regarding quotations, trends showed an inverse relationship with article volume until 2016, but largely paralleled article volume thereafter. Quotations reached a maximum of 5,622 in 2017 and remained above 2,000 even during the pandemic. Notably, in 2023, quotations recovered to pre-pandemic levels at 5,160, indicating a re-expansion of citation practices in political reporting. This suggests that South Korean media actively utilized statements from external experts and institutions regarding China's policy shifts following the pandemic.

By contrast, economic news coverage generally exhibits a lower volume than political reporting, with relatively smaller year-on-year fluctuations. Starting with 741 cases in 2012, the volume decreased to 473 in 2013 but recovered in 2014 (828 cases) and 2015 (842 cases)

amid discussions on the Korea-China FTA. Coverage sharply decreased in 2016 (402 cases) and 2017 (410 cases). However, in 2018, as the U.S.-China trade conflict intensified alongside issues related to THAAD deployment, economic reporting increased once more, expanding to 673 cases in 2018 and 786 in 2019. Although the volume dropped to 577 cases in 2020 at the onset of the pandemic, it showed a gradual recovery from 2021 onwards, driven by events such as the urea solution supply crisis and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute. By 2023, it reached 915 cases, recovering to the levels seen in the mid-2010s. Trends in quotations mirrored those in article volume, peaking at 2,654 in 2015, before exhibiting subsequent fluctuations. In 2020, quotations fell to 1,293, but rose again starting in 2021, reaching 2,238 in 2023. This resurgence appears to be driven by discussions on China's post-COVID economic reopening and the restructuring of global supply chains, which revitalized the media's use of citations. This reflects the characteristics of media reporting, where citation-based analysis and interpretation are strengthened during key transitional phases owing to the structural interconnectedness of the South Korean and Chinese economies.

To summarize, from 2012 to 2023, economic news about China maintained a stable volume, despite fewer articles and quotations than political news. By contrast, political coverage exhibited significant volatility driven by specific political issues and external shocks, such as the pandemic. Notably, there was a pronounced increase in citations in political reporting. This indicates that the media required more external statements and professional evaluations due to the diplomatic and security significance of China's political issues for South Korea. In terms of economic coverage, citations increased during critical phases, including the U.S.-China trade war, supply chain shifts, and the post-pandemic economic recovery. This reflects that the South Korean economy is significantly influenced by structural changes in the global economy.

Changes in News Sources and Keywords in China-related Political Coverage

Changes in sources and keywords within China-related political coverage from 2012 to 2023 offer critical insights into how the South

Korean media has interpreted and constructed political issues regarding China. As shown in Figure 2, a total of 12,625 sources were featured in political reporting throughout the entire period, with an annual average of over 1,000 sources. Starting at 1,001 in 2012, the figure increased gradually, reaching 1,185 in 2017. Conversely, during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the numbers decreased to 817 and 784, respectively. This decline confirms the impact of restricted journalistic access and a contraction in coverage of Chinese political affairs. However, after the end of the pandemic, as China-related political issues resurfaced, the number of sources surged to 1,173 in 2022 and 1,387 in 2023, reaching the highest level over the entire period. Keywords exhibited a similar trajectory. The total number of keywords was 34,791, with an annual average of over 2,500. Notably, in 2017, China's diplomatic standing garnered significant attention due to government transitions in South Korea and the U.S., North Korea's sixth nuclear test, and former President Moon Jae-in's visit to China; consequently, the number of keywords expanded to 3,745. While the figures dipped to 2,193 and 2,050 in 2020 and 2021, respectively, they rebounded sharply to 3,450 in 2023 as global geopolitical uncertainty intensified post-pandemic. This suggests that China-related political issues in South Korea are closely coupled with shifts in domestic and international landscapes, leading to an expansion of the semantic scope of media coverage.

An examination of the source structure in China-related political reporting from 2012 to 2023 reveals that the most prominent feature is an excessive reliance on Chinese government sources, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Table 1). Within the top 25 sources, the combined citations of "China" (1,087), "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China" (704), "Spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (576), "Chinese Government" (255), along with spokespersons "Hua Chunying" (212) and "Lu Kang" (209), indicate that a significant proportion of source citations converges toward a single diplomatic channel. In actual reporting, generic keywords such as "China" or "Chinese Government" often requote briefings from the Foreign Ministry, creating a structure where China's official position is effectively reduced to the statements of the Foreign Ministry. This structure is particularly pronounced during high-intensity conflict issues, such as North Korea's nuclear tests, the ouster of Jang Song-thaek, shifts in North Korea-China




Figure 2. Trends in the sources and keywords exposed to political and economic reports related to China, 2012-2023

relations, the THAAD deployment, the U.S.-China trade conflict, and historical/territorial disputes between China and Japan. This demonstrates that the South Korean media posits China not as a multi-layered political actor, but as a unitary state actor responding to diplomatic and security issues.

Viewed through the lens of the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” frame, this disproportionate reliance on Chinese government sources labels China as an external variable that threatens or exerts pressure on South Korea’s security environment. Statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its spokespersons are predominantly linked to security and strategic issues, such as North Korea, denuclearization, THAAD, and nuclear weapons, triggering a chain of follow-up reports detailing the responses of the South Korean and U.S. governments. Furthermore, the co-occurrence of keywords such as “U.S.,” “Japan,” “UN Security Council,” and “International Society” suggests that China’s position is rarely interpreted independently (see Table 2). Instead, it is evaluated against the standards of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the international community to determine whether it is acceptable or dangerous. In other words, the more the source network focuses on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the more it reinforces South Korean broadcasters’ tendency to perceive China as a security

Table 1. Top 25 Sources of Importance of China-Related Political News, 2012-2023

Sources	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
China	28	157	33	142	140	114	77	64	34	32	83	183	1087
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China	26	95	8	93	137	58	50	28	24	38	39	108	704
Spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry	6	6	5	1	25	3	57	58	42	56	112	205	576
Moon Jae-in						161	122	107	45	77	12		524
Korean Central Television (KCTV, DPRK)	7	43	14	123	66	72	36	38	16	5	15	26	461
Donald Trump						149	131	113	64				457
Yoon Suk-yeol											189	186	375
Park Geun-hye		111	19	117	114	1							362
The Blue House	1	43	2	56	27	49	43	64	41	19	2		347
Xi Jinping		15	6	31	8	41	60	42	12	15	52	60	342
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	5	43	5	58	60	11	11	11	13	35	44	46	342
Global Times	3	65		54	54	63	28	21	3	7	9	24	331
Shinzo Abe		81	6	62	48	64	10	40	4				315
The White House	6	19	1	30	10	32	28	29	8	12	53	39	267
Chinese Government	12	70	10	31	50	22	0	12	1	2	15	30	255
South Korean Government	12	29	7	33	16	24	21	24	13	9	7	50	245
Yoshihide Suga		65	16	94	15	29	2	13	1				235
Ministry of National Defense	4	38	8	27	44	24		13		9	27	36	230
Xinhua News Agency	6	18	2	67	32	23	31	9	1	2	15	19	225
People Power Party (PPP)									3	29	100	88	220

Sources	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Democratic Party of Korea		26	1			13	20	21	15	20	50	53	219
Hua Chunying		62	14	39	33	31	24	4	3	2			212
Joe Biden										59	57	95	211
Lu Kang				17	47	64	33	48					209
Kyodo News	1	20	1	58	27	22	8	25	1	7	12	17	199

threat. This ultimately bolsters the “Security with the U.S.” component of the framework—the perception that national security is structured primarily around the alliance with the United States.

A critical observation regarding news sources is the simultaneous prominence of leaders and government agencies from South Korea, the United States, and Japan. South Korean presidents Moon Jae-in (524), Park Geun-hye (362), and Yoon Suk-yeol (375), along with key U.S. and Japanese actors such as Trump (457), Biden (211), Abe (315), Suga (235), the White House (267), and the Ministry of National Defense (230), all rank within the top 20 sources (see Table 1). Notably, citations of these sources surged simultaneously during periods of heightened international security crises, such as the THAAD deployment (2016–2017), the U.S.-China trade war (2018–2020), and recent tensions involving the Ukrainian War, the Taiwan Strait, and Japan’s release of wastewater (2022–2023). This signifies that political news regarding China functions less as a medium for explaining “China” itself and more as a platform for articulating the strategic choices and alliance architectures of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan regarding China. The particularly high frequency of South Korean presidents is attributed to the fact that China-related issues are directly linked to domestic debates on foreign strategy, including the ROK-China summits, the ROK-U.S. alliance, the stance of appeasement versus containment toward China, and participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Consequently, South Korean broadcast coverage of China reinforces a structural framework that simultaneously addresses ROK-China, ROK-U.S., and ROK-Japan relations, while ceaselessly questioning the extent to which South Korea should align with the U.S. rather than manage its relationship with China independently.

The utilization of foreign media as information sources also interacts with the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” frame, thereby reinforcing a conflict-oriented perception. Media outlets such as North Korea’s *Korean Central Television* (461 cases), China’s *Global Times* (331 cases), *Xinhua News Agency* (225 cases), and Japan’s *Kyodo News* (199 cases) were all conducive to dramatically highlighting conflict situations. In particular, the *Global Times*, a sister publication of the *People’s Daily* known for its strong nationalism and aggressive tone, was cited by South Korean broadcasters more frequently than *CCTV* or the *People’s Daily*. This demonstrates the tendency to select sources with the most provocative, conflict-driven tones from the diverse spectrum of voices within China. Consequently, even though China’s foreign policy is not invariably hardline, the voice of China conveyed to South Korean audiences is predominantly hawkish, as seen in messages from the *Global Times* and Foreign Ministry briefings. This selectivity in sourcing symbolizes China not as a partner for cooperation or coordination, but as an actor that instigates conflict and amplifies security anxiety.

Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the source composition by nation and actor reveals that political coverage regarding China is predominantly governed by the “Security with the U.S.” premise within the broader “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” framework. Chinese sources are heavily concentrated in extremely limited official channels, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Xi Jinping. In contrast, third-party sources, such as Russia and the EU, are scarcely utilized. In contrast, sources from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan exhibit a relatively broad spectrum, encompassing not only presidents and government administrations but also defense ministries, ruling and opposition parties, and experts. In essence, while China is simplified into a few official voices, the U.S. and South Korea are structured as entities in which diverse actors offer pluralistic perspectives. This source asymmetry positions China as a source of security risk and conflict, while situating the U.S. and South Korea as key actors in managing and coordinating those risks. Naturally, this reproduces the perception that security centers on the U.S., while China is an object of management and containment. In sum, the data from 2012–2023 demonstrates that the selection and network of sources in China-related political news are already deeply subsumed within the Security with

the U.S., Economy with China frame. Consequently, this structural bias prioritizes translating China-related issues into problems of security anxiety and alliance realignment in South Korean society.

An examination of the keyword network in China-related political coverage from 2012 to 2023 revealed that the most prominent feature was the complete structuring of political and security issues surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue. The top 10 keywords were China (5,891) at the apex, followed by the U.S. (3,154), South Korea (2,121), Japan (1,618), North Korea (1,606), Russia (803), the UN Security Council (805), and the International society (765), all of which are stakeholders surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue or international organizations (see Table 2). Despite the ostensible coverage of China, keywords related to China's domestic affairs or internal policies rarely appear in the top rankings. Instead, China is positioned primarily as a neighbor to North Korea or a key variable in the Northeast Asian security structure. This indicates a tendency for China-related coverage to converge into a multilateral security framework involving the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia rather than offering an independent analysis of China itself.

Marking 2017—the year of the Trump administration's inauguration and North Korea's nuclear tests—as a turning point, there was a simultaneous surge in security-related keywords such as “U.S.” (469), “North Korea” (334), “Kim Jong-un” (143), and “UN Security Council” (117). Consequently, political coverage repositioned China as an intermediary between shifts in U.S. strategy toward China and the unfolding of the North Korean nuclear crisis. During this period, as the Trump administration's pressure campaign intensified, the U.S.-China conflict escalated. Rather than directly analyzing China, South Korean broadcasters covered China within the reflexive context of changes in U.S. policies and stances toward Beijing. As a result, the keywords in China-related political news reinforced a U.S.-dependent security narrative, anchored in a triangular structure connecting the U.S.–North Korea relations–ROK-U.S. alliance–U.S.-China relations. This led to a concentration on topic selection in which China is treated not as an independent subject but merely as a variable within the North Korean nuclear matrix and the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry.

Among the top-ranking keywords, “denuclearization” (1,048

Table 2. Top 25 Keyword Linking Importance in China-Related Political News, 2012-2023

Key words	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
China	609	689	476	425	470	645	469	384	364	352	444	564	5891
U.S.	181	279	179	139	185	469	310	288	230	288	282	324	3154
South Korea	163	190	177	174	154	257	111	165	152	153	200	225	2121
Japan	141	210	195	155	87	111	68	184	74	93	111	189	1618
North Korea	135	202	142	103	150	334	142	122	42	39	97	98	1606
Denuclearization	31	175	67	34	75	87	235	178	19	60	54	33	1048
Kim Jong-un	72	118	71	98	116	143	155	110	58	14	27	42	1024
UN Security Council	73	95	33	33	139	117	58	39	10	30	76	102	805
Russia	40	50	55	44	37	82	62	65	20	47	112	189	803
international society	84	96	63	65	114	67	43	32	25	37	62	77	765
possibility	53	73	55	60	51	82	61	73	20	33	57	75	693
Korea-US	23	40	32	66	49	99	49	36	26	64	70	98	652
THAAD			20	56	183	251	6	6	6	11	41	2	582
nuclear test	52	139	46	28	106	71	20	14			76	7	559
Both countries	39	51	30	35	25	77	39	78	15	29	41	83	542
people	31	48	42	58	72	74	42	24	41	27	28	50	537
Summit	13	38	50	63	12	47	115	74	2	19	31	35	499
dialogue	29	72	25	25	22	98	52	57	16	27	36	22	481
Korean Peninsula	25	38	23	28	36	92	72	62	6	28	42	22	474
North Korean Chairman	25	25	8	13	14	6	123	125	43	9	23	20	434
president	16	16	6	19	22	97	42	61	43	14	35	59	430
The Republic of Korea	26	17	30	32	45	41	18	39	18	15	67	80	428
nuclear weapon	34	61	30	18	61	72	34	22	13	11	35	37	428
government	36	36	33	31	34	57	35	39	22	17	29	39	408
Northeast Asia	56	46	46	61	29	44	34	16	10	6	15	17	380

cases) stands out as the only non-entity keyword (i.e., not nation, leader, or institution). This indicates that the entire narrative of China-related political coverage is structured around the North Korean nuclear issue and its denuclearization. However, noteworthy, the concept of denuclearization covered by South Korean broadcasters focused not on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula advocated by China, but on the denuclearization of North Korea emphasized by the U.S. and South Korea. In other words, China's concept of comprehensive denuclearization, which includes nuclear disarmament by North Korea, the U.S., and South Korea, was virtually excluded from the reporting structure. Although China has emphasized political resolution through dialogue and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks since 2017, keywords such as "dialogue," "Summit," "Northeast Asia," and "denuclearization" have continuously diminished in South Korean broadcast news. This reveals a shift in the informational frame, suggesting that South Korean broadcasters no longer view China as a capable mediator or problem solver. Instead, they aligned the North Korean nuclear issue framework with the U.S.-centric framework of deterrence and pressure.

In contrast, keywords such as "ROK-U.S." (652 cases), "THAAD" (582 cases), and "Nuclear Test" (559 cases) surged, peaking between 2015 and 2017. This indicates that China-related coverage has shifted toward a narrative that explains South Korea's diplomatic choices in the context of North Korea's nuclear tests and alliance/bloc dynamics. Through a series of events—ranging from THAAD deployment and the advancement of North Korean nuclear capabilities to President Moon Jae-in's visit to China and the North Korea-U.S. summit, the coverage did not focus on changes in the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia as a whole. Instead, it constructed narratives centered on questions such as "Which bloc will South Korea stand with?" "How will the North Korean nuclear issue be resolved?"

In summary, the keyword network of China-related political coverage has reinforced an analytical framework that positions China not as an independent actor, but as an entity subordinate to external structures: the North Korean nuclear issue, alliance dynamics, and the U.S.–China conflict. While keywords reflecting China's policy shifts, such as the Six-Party Talks, Northeast Asian cooperation, and mediation through dialogue, have reduced or disappeared, U.S.-centric security

frames (including ROK–U.S. relations, THAAD, the UN Security Council, nuclear deterrence, and U.S.-North Korea summits) have formed a dominant structure. This keyword structure suggests that the security aspect of the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” frame has been strongly emphasized in political reporting. It reveals a structural tendency in which South Korean broadcasters reposition China within U.S.-led security frames rather than treating China’s own political and diplomatic strategies as independent subjects of analysis.

Changes in News Sources and Keywords in China-related Economic Coverage

Unlike political coverage, China-related economic news reports by South Korean broadcasters from 2012 to 2023 formed a multilayered and professional source structure. While political reporting exhibited a monolithic structure centered on official government statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Xi, economic reporting featured a diverse array of institutions and experts responsible for economic, policy, and market information. These include the Bank of Korea (60 cases); the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (61 cases); the People’s Bank of China (43 cases); the IMF and various experts and analysts (see Table 3). Thus, economic news sources construct a pluralistic ecosystem in which the government, market, and international organizations are complexly intertwined. This structure focuses on empirically explaining South Korea’s industrial and financial structures in response to structural changes in the Chinese economy.

Within the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” framework, economic coverage reinforces the structural perception of “Economy with China”—meaning that the economy is centered on China. In stark contrast to political coverage, U.S. policy and government sources rarely appear among the top rankings in economic news. Furthermore, the U.S. government is not regarded as a primary agent of analysis for China-related economic issues. Instead, to directly assess the impact of China’s economic trajectory on South Korea’s economy, exports, and supply chains, the media used Chinese government policy announcements, research institutes, and industrial statistics as

Table 3. Top 25 Sources of Importance of China-Related Economic News, 2012-2023

Sources	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
China	9	16	12	67	27	7	23	27	12	17	4	34	255
Donald Trump						3	32	73	10				118
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson							33	13	2	2	9	30	89
Director of Economic Research								7	7	12	14	39	79
Seoul City				20			1	37	6	8	5		77
Professor of Economics				23			2	23	12			6	66
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy		7	2	2			1	17	6	9	6	11	61
Bank of Korea		1	4	20			2	5	4	3	5	16	60
Company representative	1	3			4			7	14		17	8	54
expert				5				2	16	26	4		53
Joe Biden									2	16	20	13	51
Moon Jae-in						4	4	8	11	22			49
Research Fellow at Hyundai Research Institute			1	41	7								49
The Wall Street Journal		2	5	2			4	25	5	0	1	4	48
people				7			4	4	1	14	17	0	47
Cho Young-moo, Research Fellow at LG Economic Research Institute				1	3		3	7	18	11	2		45
Manufacturer's representative	1		1	27				12		3			44
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Hong Nam-ki							3	4	12	17	8		44

Sources	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
People's Bank of China		1		24			5	10			2	1	43
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choo Kyung-ho												41	41
IMF	1	1	0	6				9	6	3	11	3	40
Director of Trade and Investment							3	10	1	2	13	11	40
Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Sung Yun-mo								10	30				40
Chinese President Xi Jinping		3		9	5		9		5	9			40
Korean government				12				9	9	3	2	5	40

key sources. This implies that economic reporting by South Korean broadcasters is structured around a flow of economic connectivity: Chinese economic trends → South Korean industrial structure → Global supply chains. The Chinese economy has established itself as a structural benchmark variable for explaining South Korea's economic outlook and industrial strategies.

Another characteristic of economic news sources is their temporal patterns, which reflect policy decisions and market fluctuations along three dimensions. During significant periods of economic shock, such as the onset of China's economic slowdown (2015–2016), the U.S.–China trade conflict (2018–2019), the COVID-19 pandemic, and China's reopening (2020–2023), exposure to sources from South Korean economic ministries, international organizations, and financial institutions steadily increased. This demonstrates a distinct feature: Unlike political reporting, where source usage surges in response to sensitive events, economic reporting exhibits gradual, steady changes in source utilization driven by structural shifts and long-term outlooks. In particular, even

during the U.S.-China trade conflict, economic coverage focused on substantive economic information, such as China's import/export policies, manufacturing indices, and yuan exchange rate adjustments, rather than statements from the U.S. government. This finding confirms that economic reporting maintains an approach to information access that is essentially different from that of political reporting.

Furthermore, in terms of economic coverage, it is crucial to note that Chinese sources function not merely as unilateral messages from the Chinese government but as signals indicating changes in the global economic structure. For instance, the South Korean media consistently utilizes a framework that connects announcements from economic institutions—such as the *Wall Street Journal*, the People's Bank of China, and the IMF—to changes in South Korea's exports, financial markets, and industrial structure. At the same time, domestic and foreign sources, including the Bank of Korea, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, research institutes, and industry representatives, provide diverse perspectives for interpreting China's economic fluctuations. Consequently, economic coverage encompasses a broader range of source diversity and comparative analysis than political coverage. As a result, unlike political reporting, which portrays China as a threat to be managed and guarded against, economic reporting tends to depict China as a structural partner inevitably linked to the South Korean economy.

In summary, the source structure of China-related economic coverage can be characterized as a systematic method of information selection that distinctly strengthens the operation of the "Economy with China" component within the "Security with the U.S., Economy with China" frame. Economic news repeatedly reproduces a structure that analyzes South Korea's industry, trade, and financial markets using Chinese economic data; in this process, U.S. sources do not serve as key elements in the analysis of the Chinese economy. In other words, in the economic realm, China is not seen as a threatening actor but as a key variable shaping the conditions of the South Korean economy. This implies that the reporting system of South Korean broadcasters from 2012 to 2023 has structurally entrenched a dual perception: viewing China as an Other to be managed in politics and security, while regarding it as an irreplaceable partner in economics. Such a source structure functions as a critical medium that will continue to influence the trajectory of South

Korean society's perceptions of China.

The keywords in China-related economic coverage from 2012 to 2023 exhibited a fundamentally different structure from that of political

Table 4. Top 25 Keyword Linking Importance in China-Related Economic News, 2012-2023

Key words	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
China	184	207	242	370	158	134	245	271	186	186	187	285	2655
U.S.	75	61	46	94	38	71	186	164	68	82	127	123	1135
South Korea	72	88	115	121	83	57	56	85	70	59	60	88	954
possibility	35	18	32	72	32	20	41	60	24	28	49	35	446
Japan	42	53	32	48	13	16	6	80	18	6	22	48	384
semiconductors	6	9	10	14	12	10	15	56	20	53	66	112	383
companies	17	30	32	59	15	15	26	32	23	36	45	43	373
Our country	37	24	35	65	21	13	13	32	17	15	41	23	336
automobile	18	8	24	44	26	10	29	37	28	26	21	36	307
competitiveness	28	26	33	51	25	10	18	11	6	27	23	28	286
consumers	14	21	22	47	18	18	9	20	16	9	23	35	252
economy	23	22	12	29	18	5	9	34	26	27	17	18	240
market	21	12	29	34	18	8	16	26	6	10	13	23	216
European Union	44	12	10	25	14	7	15	8	21	7	22	19	204
Made in China	21	23	16	22	13	10	19	18	8	16	13	19	198
exports	15	2	8	21	12	11	9	18	19	4	19	46	184
FTA	38	10	41	45	8	19	4	4			10	2	181
jobs	10	10	8	20	14	21	33	9	14	8	13	20	180
uncertainty	13	10	10	20	7	6	6	31	11	6	20	34	174
prices	7	12	17	26	20	4	12	18	6	24	14	11	171
covid-19									98	29	36	7	170
Vendor	16	4	32	34	7	7	8	16	13	13	6	7	163
Growth rate	15	18	6	30	13	4	2	10	13	7	13	31	162
electric vehicles			2	10	6	10	14	19	8	18	31	43	161
Yuan	7	6	25	55	12		4	17		9	12	2	149

coverage. The most distinct characteristic is that economic reporting constructs China not as a security risk, but as a central axis of economic influence. “China” ranks first with 2,655 occurrences, followed by the “U.S.” (1,135), “South Korea” (954), “Japan” (384), and the “European Union” (204) (see Table 4). This demonstrates that South Korean broadcasters perceive China as the “structural center of the economic environment” within the economic domain. Furthermore, it indicates that, unlike the “Security with the U.S.” tendency observed in security reporting, the “Economy with China” frame operates independently within economic coverage.

Furthermore, the keywords in economic coverage exhibit a significant structural difference from those in political coverage, characterized by the prominent appearance of terminology related to situations, statistics, markets, and industries. For instance, important keywords such as “semiconductors” (383), “companies” (373), “automobiles” (307), “market” (216), “exports” (184), “FTA” (181), and “yuan” (149) feature prominently. This indicates that, unlike political coverage, which was driven by a linear narrative centered on North Korean nuclear issues, diplomacy, and security, economic coverage deals with multi-layered variables, such as market structures, international trade, financial policies, and macro-indicators. Consequently, the keywords appear to be more diverse and specialized. Given that China-related economic coverage has a reporting structure centered on market structures and indicators rather than events and crises, the professionalism of the sources (financial institutions, research institutes, analysts, etc.) and specialization of keywords mutually reinforce each other.

Another core characteristic of economic coverage is that, even amidst the backdrop of the U.S.–China conflict, China and the United States are established as equivalent economic variables. For instance, while the keywords “U.S.” and “China” appear consistently, the narrative does not emphasize confrontation as seen in political reporting. Instead, it focuses on explaining changes in the economic system, such as competition and supply chain restructuring. Keywords such as “semiconductors,” “companies,” “uncertainty,” and “electric vehicles (EVs)” are structured as components of economic structural shifts resulting from U.S. attempts to reorganize global supply chains. In essence, while the U.S.–China relationship in political reporting constitutes a security threat frame, it

transforms into a market volatility and policy risk frame in economic reporting.

A notable aspect of the keywords in the economic coverage is that they clearly reveal the areas in which the South Korean economy is highly dependent or sensitive. For instance, keywords such as “exports,” “growth rate,” “semiconductors,” “companies,” “consumers,” “jobs,” “prices,” “firms,” and “yuan” are evenly distributed. This demonstrates that South Korea’s industrial structure is sensitive to China’s economic fluctuations and bilateral trade. Accordingly, economic reporting constructs narratives that directly link China’s economic slowdown, recovery, and policy changes to South Korea’s growth rate, exports, and industrial competitiveness. In other words, China is established not as an Other, but as an external environment that substantially defines the South Korean economy.

However, most economy-related keywords peaked in 2015, following the implementation of the Korea-China FTA. Between 2016 and 2020, despite being the period when China’s THAAD-related sanctions and the U.S.-China trade conflict began, the frequency of many keywords remained comparable to that in other periods. Nevertheless, specific keywords such as “semiconductors,” “automobiles,” “Chinese-made products,” “jobs,” “uncertainty,” and “electric vehicles (EVs)” began to increase during 2018–2019. From 2021 onward, these terms continued to increase alongside keywords such as “companies,” “European Union,” “prices,” and “growth rate.” This indicates that the market began to react in tandem with the attempts at economic structural restructuring initiated by the Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations (inaugurated in 2022).

Synthesizing these findings, the keywords in China-related economic coverage exhibit a pattern that is fundamentally different from the fixed narrative structure of “North Korean nuclear threat–security conflict–U.S.-China hegemonic competition” emphasized in political coverage. Whereas political reporting, grounded in “Security with the U.S.,” portrayed China as a security threat or a mediator of conflict, economic reporting clearly employs the “Economy with China” frame, presenting China as an essential economic partner and the central axis of the economic environment. This keyword network demonstrates that the political and economic domains of China-related reporting operate

under completely different perceptual systems and structural logics. This suggests that the South Korean media's perception of China varies significantly across sectors.

Conclusion

This study analyzes how South Korean broadcasters covered China-related issues, focusing on information sources and topics, against the backdrop of South Korea's "Security with the U.S., Economy with China" strategy following the deepening of economic ties since diplomatic normalization. This research examines political and economic news from 2012 to 2023 aired by Korea's representative broadcasters: KBS, MBC, SBS, and YTN. The results confirm that the South Korean media's perception of China has formed a dual structure, clearly separating the political and economic domains. Political reporting relied on extremely limited official Chinese channels, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its spokespersons, President Xi Jinping, and the Chinese government. Conversely, leaders from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, along with the Blue House, White House, and South Korean government, emerged as central sources. Thematic keywords were similarly conflict-oriented, focusing on diplomatic and security issues such as the North Korean nuclear program, THAAD, summits, and the UN Security Council. This structure tends to represent China as a security stakeholder or variable in international conflict rather than a cooperative partner. Consequently, it reinforced the archetypal "Security with the U.S." frame, where U.S. perspectives, policies, and statements are inextricably linked. In this process, China-related sources tended to skew sharply in response to situational events. Furthermore, excessive reliance on media with strong nationalist tendencies, such as the *Global Times*, revealed a limitation in failing to adequately reflect the diverse perspectives and structural understanding of China.

Conversely, the network of information sources and keywords in economic coverage evolved in a starkly distinct direction from that of political reporting. The key sources of economic news centered on diverse professional institutions, including the People's Bank of China, the Bank of Korea, international organizations, and financial experts.

Similarly, keywords were predominated by terminology grounded in macroeconomics and industrial structures, such as trade, exchange rates, exports, markets, growth, and supply chains. Within this structure, China was perceived not as a security Other, but as a key economic partner that structurally defines the South Korean economy. Even the U.S.-China conflict was interpreted as a matter of economic risk and policy fluctuation. These reporting practices signify that the “Economy with China” frame, which reflects South Korea’s economic dependence on China, is operating stably within the economic domain. However, shifts in keywords from 2021 indicate South Korea’s emerging move to adjust its economic and industrial landscapes.

In conclusion, South Korean broadcast coverage of China revealed conflicting source ecosystems and perceptual structures within the two distinct realms of politics and economy. While political coverage presented China as a source of conflict and tension within the U.S.-centric security alliance structure, thereby reinforcing the “Security with the U.S.” frame, economic coverage entrenched the “Economy with China” frame by treating China as an essential economic environment within the China-centric market and industrial structure. Despite dealing with the same subject, South Korean media applied different perceptual frames by sector. This reproduced a structural contradiction that simultaneously defines China as both a security Other and an essential economic partner. This dual structure influences South Korean society’s perception of China and is likely to undermine the consistency of policy, public opinion, and foreign strategy. Moving forward, coverage of China needs to move beyond source structures that are biased toward specific events or conflict phases. By securing diverse sources, experts, and multifaceted perspectives, the media must mitigate the disconnect between political and economic reporting to provide a more balanced and in-depth understanding of China.

Note

The analysis of political broadcast news in this study is a revised and adapted version of the analytical framework presented in Wu, C. & Park, D. (2025), Big Data Analysis of South Korean Broadcasting’s China-Related Political News Coverage. *The Journal of Modern China Studies*, 26(4): 337-368.

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韩国广播媒体中的中国形象：政治与经济的二元框架

摘要：本研究分析了“安全靠美国、经济靠中国”这一框架如何在韩国实际电视新闻中被再生产。通过采集2012–2023年间韩国主要电视台涉华政治与经济报道的大数据，本文对新闻来源与关键词进行了网络分析。结果显示，韩国媒体对中国的报道呈现出一种二元感知结构：政治与经济领域被截然分开。政治报道依赖有限的官方渠道，内容以安全冲突为主；经济报道则来源多元，关键词聚焦于市场与产业。一个鲜明的“经济靠中国”框架由此显现，将中国视为韩国经济“不可替代的伙伴”和关键结构性变量。研究实证表明，韩国电视台通过把中国同时界定为安全威胁与经济伙伴，再生产了结构性的矛盾。

关键词：韩中关系、安全靠美国、经济靠中国、新闻框架分析、来源分析、新闻大数据分析

한국 방송 미디어의 중국 인식: 정치와 경제의 이분법적 프레임

초록: 본 연구는 한국의 방송 뉴스에서 ‘안미경중(安美經中: 안보는 미국과 경제는 중국과 협력)’ 프레임이 어떻게 재생산되는지 분석하였다. 이를 위해 2012년부터 2023년까지 한국의 주요 방송사에서 보도된 중국 관련 정치·경제 뉴스 빅데이터를 활용하여 뉴스 정보원 및 뉴스 주제어 연결망 분석을 수행했다. 분석 결과, 한국의 대중((對中) 보도는 정치와 경제 영역에서 극명하게 분리된 이중적 인식 구조를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 정치 보도는 제한된 공식 채널(정부 정보원 등)에 의존하며 안보 갈등 이슈가 주를 이룬 반면, 경제 보도는 다양한 정보원을 활용하여 시장 및 산업 관련 키워드에 집중하는 경향을 보였다. 특히 중국을 ‘대체 불가능한 파트너’이자 한국 경제의 핵심적인 구조적 변수로 인식하는 뚜렷한 ‘경중(經中)’ 프레임이 확인되었다. 결론적으로 본 연구는 한국 방송사들이 중국을 안보 위협인 동시에 경제 파트너로 규정함으로써 구조적 모순을 재생산하고 있음을 실증적으로 규명하였다.

주제어: 한-중 관계, 안미경중, 뉴스 프레임 분석, 정보원 분석, 뉴스 빅데이터

韓国放送メディアにおける中国認識： 政治と経済の二重フレーム

要旨: 本研究は「安保は米国、経済は中国」というフレームが韓国の実際のテレビニュースでどのように再生産されているかを分析する。2012～2023年に韓国の主要放送局が放送した中国関連の政治・経済ニュースのビッグデータを用い、報道ソースとキーワードのネットワーク分析を実施した。その結果、韓国メディアの中国報道は政治分野と経済分野が峻別された二重的認知構造を呈することが明らかになった。政治報道は限定的な公式チャンネルに依存し、安保紛争が支配的であった。経済報道は多様な情報源を引用し、市場・産業特化のキーワードに焦点を当てた。中国を「かけがえのないパートナー」であり韓国経済の重要な構造変数と捉える「経済は中国」フレームが明確に出現した。本研究は、韓国の放送局が中国を安保脅威と経済パートナー同時に規定することで構造的矛盾を再生産することを実証的に示した。

キーワード: 韓中関係、安保は米国、経済は中国、ニュース・フレーム分析、ソース分析、ニュース・ビッグデータ分析

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