

# Traditional Values and the Gender Difference in Political Efficacy:

## A Comparative Study of Three East Asian Societies

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**Abstract:** The global gender gap in political participation is an undeniable fact. As a key factor influencing political participation, political efficacy is essential for civil society mobilization, the generation of diffuse support for the political system, and the prevention of corruption in democracies. In this sense, political efficacy is a cornerstone of democratic consolidation. Yet to date, no systematic study has examined the gender gap in political efficacy in East Asia. This article aims to fill that gap. Focusing on three East Asian societies: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, this study revisits Inglehart and Norris's cultural explanation of gender differences. We argue that East Asian traditional values reduce women's political efficacy, but not men's. Unsurprisingly, traditional culture continues to play a significant role in shaping women's political attitudes, albeit in a negative way.

**Keywords:** Traditional Values, Political Efficacy, Gender Gap, East Asian Democracies


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## Global Gender Gap in Political Empowerment

Gender gap is an undeniable reality. According to the 2018 Gender Inequality Index (hereafter: GII) reported by United Nations Development Programme (hereafter: UNDP), gender inequity is still apparent in most places worldwide. In the same year, the Gender Gap Index (GGI) which issued by the World Economic Forum (hereafter: WEF) pointing out gender gaps in four indicators: economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment, and the most serious circumstance happened in the political empowerment field. This indicator comprises ratios of women to men in three political participation aspects, including “seats in parliament,” “ministerial level,” and “head of state.” Therefore, the enormous gender gap represents the truth that state powers are usually in men’s hands, and women can barely participate in the political process.

Despite women making up half of the population, their political participation rates are far behind those of men, even nowadays. Such a situation happens not only in the Western world but is even worse in



Data source: The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, World Economic Forum

**Figure 1.** Global performance of Gender Gap Index

East Asia. In fact, even though women state leaders have been elected in recent years, the proportions of women legislators in East Asian countries and regions still fall behind the global average. According to data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the global average of women in national parliaments is 24.30% in April 2019, compared to the average of the East Asian region<sup>1</sup> with 21.44%.

The existence of a significant gender gap in political participation reflects a more substantial problem beyond the percentage of women elected officials. Some studies point out that the underlying explanation for such a gap is the reluctance to participate in politics, which has a socio-psychological basis (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001: 360). The mechanism is that some of the political attitudes, which are essentially psychological, attenuate one's will to take action on political issues. One such significant political attitude noticed by scholars is political efficacy, initially defined as a "feeling that political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954: 187). It means that citizens, as the core of the self-governing regime, could recognize their role in the political process and think they can understand and influence public affairs.

Political efficacy has, thus, been generally regarded as an important driver of participation. This indicates, the explanatory variables affecting political efficacy are going to influence political participation as well (Yang & Lin, 2011). In that, political efficacy is essential for supporting a democratic regime. It would not only inspire citizens to be involved in collective action, revitalizing civil society, but also help to prevent political authorities from corruption (Wu, Tang, & Huang, 2000). In that manner, political efficacy had been seen as the cornerstone of democratic consolidation and drew much attention from academics.

However, it is irrefutable that men have higher efficacy than women, even nowadays. Women have a lesser probability of considering themselves as capable of understanding and having impacts on politics in related works (Arens & Watermann, 2017; Chen & Lien, 2008; Huang, 2005; Yang & Lin, 2011). As one of the socialization approaches, Campbell et al. (1960) point out that women become more politically passive in the socialization process because of traditional gender-role labeling, which makes them consider politics as one of men's fields,

Women are not only less interested in politics but also receive less information about politics. Thus, women have lower engagement in politics than men, which has consequences for the gender difference in political participation (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). Inglehart and Norris (2003) provide us further evidence that gender gaps exist in political interest, political discussion, and participation in party membership worldwide.

Few empirical studies have systemically dealt with the gender gap in political efficacy. Most of the works rely on data collected in Western democracies and build the theories through socialization. Thus, we turn our focus to non-Western democracies and try to provide a cultural explanation for this issue. This study focuses on three East Asian societies: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as they have very similar levels of political and economic development, which manifest in their ranking in Human Development Index, the rating from Freedom House, as well as the GDP per capita and average education level.

In terms of path toward wealthy and liberal, all three societies not only have been part of “East Asian miracles” economically but also thrived as the most stable democracies and democratic allies in the Pacific region. The similarity between them draws much of the comparativists’ attention. As political efficacy and participation are indispensable ingredients for sustaining democratic ways of life, we should focus on public engagement with democracy in those societies. Apart from the modernization process, these societies all share a long history of common cultural heritage of Confucianism and the cohesion and interaction of norms and values in East Asia. Thus, it would be difficult to neglect the cultural logic behind the political and economic development of those societies. This article holds the same point of view that the legacies of the culture sphere would matter in shaping the gender difference of political attitudes, hence generating the gender gap we observed. In addition to this, in terms of how and how much would culture matter might also differ from Western experiences.

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we examine the possible explanations for political efficacy, then we elaborate how this research modifies the classic cultural theories in order to fit cultural explanations to the East Asian context. After testing hypotheses via empirical analyses, our findings show that traditional views of “orientation

toward authority” are going to hinder women’s efficacy but could boost that of men, generating the gender gap that we have observed.

## **Factors Influencing Political Efficacy: Existing Theories**

There are two dimensions of political efficacy: “internal” efficacy refers to people’s perception of their own ability to understand and to participate in public affairs, and the “external” part relates to people’s feeling of government’s response to their demand (Balch, 1974). In sum, political efficacy is one’s feeling of whether they could understand politics and influence political output. In this article, we only deal with the external part of political efficacy as we suppose that most people become politically active only when they realize that their action is relevant to policy formation.

In the early empirical study of political efficacy, Abramson (1972) finds that Black children have less political efficacy and trust political leaders less than their White counterparts. Abramson later proposes two theories to explain his finding: social deprivation and political-reality. Those explanations elaborate on how ethnic differences lead to unequal imagination toward politics. Social deprivation explains how one’s ethnicity affects people’s self-perception, by contrast, political-reality describes how people are affected by the outside environment. Researchers follow Abramson’s two explanations of how political efficacy is built subsequently. In a pilot study, Wu, Tang, and Huang (2000) conclude there are three categories of factors affecting political efficacy: social-economic and demographic variables, subjective variables such as party identity and ideology, and environmental variables such as culture and modernization level.

### ***Individual Factors***

The individual factors include psychological relevant variables such as party identity, subjective social status, and ideology, as well as psychological irrelevant variables such as demographic factors and socioeconomic status, which encompass gender, education, ethnicity,

and so on. Chen and Lien (2008) point out party identity is the major component of shaping political efficacy. They find people who identify themselves with Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are going to have higher efficacy as a party identifier, and would be more involved with politics than others. In addition, Chen and Keng (2008) find that Taiwanese people who identify themselves as an incumbent supporter give a higher score on the "governmental responsiveness" rating. Likewise, Huang (2005) analyzes public opinion before and after power-shift in Taiwan in 2000 found that internal political efficacy would not be affected by party alternation, proving that internal efficacy was a relatively stable and consistent attitude. In contrast, external efficacy would be influenced by power alternation because of party identity, revealing that external efficacy is prone to being affected by the external environment.

Another vital variable is education. Easton and Dennis (1967) point out that children establish their perception of the political world since primary school, and such perception would increase with growth and is related to family background and IQ. Moreover, Chen and Lien (2008) found that in Taiwan, people with a higher education level would have higher political efficacy. In the US, Arens and Watermann (2017) report a gender gap in the political efficacy of high school students, in that boys have higher efficacy than girls because of political socialization through education. Cohen, Vigoda, and Samorly (2001) disintegrate the effects of income and education on self-dignity, locus of control, and political efficacy in North Israel with SEM modeling in detail. They find an increase in the socioeconomic status improved self-dignity and self-confirmation, positively affecting political efficacy and then finally raising people's level of participation in public affairs.

We could summarize that a few individual factors are relevant to one's efficacy according to existing literature. Nevertheless, those socioeconomic background or subjective attitude could explain dissimilarity between each observation but not between each group. For example, Arens and Watermann (2017) have found that for high school students, education and socialization are almost the same as they go to the same high school and live in the adjacent neighborhoods. Therefore, those indicators could not explain the gender gap. The gap itself must be shaped before or apart from the social empowerment process resulting

from socialization. We then introduce the second genre of elements concerning political efficacy — contextual factors — to explain these between-group differences in the next section.

### ***Contextual Factors***

The difference in efficacy between groups reflects the different treatment that they receive in the society because of their relative positions on the social scale. Namely, a White man with an above-average social status would receive a better deal than Black women with lower social status. The distinction of the treatment they receive does not merely come from wealth or education but also originates in the social-constructed culture values, which we describe as “contextual factors.” In 1990, Bobo and Gilliam found that Black people showed higher political knowledge, political efficacy, and political participation when they had a Black mayor. They illustrate the “political empowerment theory,” which emphasizes the origin of ethnicity gaps of political efficacy comes from the political empowerment; once a member from a disadvantaged subgroup entered power center, other members become inspired, thus accelerating the effectiveness of and the willingness for participating in politics.

West (2017) focused on 2008 US Democratic Primaries, where the last two candidates, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, both belonged to minority groups, to find whether the same empowerment effect existed in Black people and women. However, such an empowerment effect only emerges in Black people, not among women. That is to say, even if Clinton had been elected at that time, women would not have felt inspired and boosted their efficacy. This work called our attention to a specific question: why women are not cheered up by women candidates and elected officials? Why political empowerment loses its magic in the case of women? It seems the socialization process consolidates the imagery that politics are “men’s issue” instead.

Yang and Lin (2011) applied the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) to analyze effectiveness of gender-role attitudes on political efficacy. Their work indicates that people generally think men are rational than women and should be in charge of public, as well as economic affairs. There is a widespread view that women are more irrational and

should take charge of housework and other domestic fields. When women have stronger traditional views of gender roles, they would have lower political efficacy; conversely, men would have higher efficacy when they possess traditional views. That means traditional attitudes of gender roles affect men and women in opposite ways, thus explaining why gender gap emerges in students who go to the same high school.

In sum, this article takes the side of the argument that culture values shape how people being socialized, and through socialization, men and women both receive the message that politics should be on men's shoulder, thus enhancing men's efficacy and reducing that of women, generating the gender gap. If cultural values in the socialization process matter in generating this gap, the next important questions would be: what is the relationship between cultural values and gender roles? What are the values that we should look into?

## **Redefined the Cultural Values in East Asian Societies**

### ***Cultural Approach***

As a contextual factor, Inglehart and Norris (2003) had adopted a cultural explanation to link cultural change and its effect on gender equality. They develop "Gender equality scale" by five gender dimension questions in the World Values Survey, providing evidence not only of the positive relationship between modernization and gender equality but also the negative effect of religiosity, illustrating the development of gender equality has been highly shaped by traditional values. From their work, we find that religion has quite strong constraints over social norms, which include the gender division of domestic chore and public affair. Of all religions, the most apparent threat to gender equality seems to be Islam, explaining the regional difference in gender equality comes from how traditional values had been preserved and clung to.

This finding of Inglehart and Norris (2003) is not only inspiring us for theoretical innovation but also provides a great tool to understand the worldwide phenomenon of gender gaps. However, it would be precarious if we treated religion as the only operationalization of traditional values. A gigantic difference exists between different cultural spheres worldwide hence one should be aware that some distinctiveness in each area might

be neglected thus facing decontextualization hazards by using religion and religiosity as the only standards of traditional values. In addition, the definition of “religiosity” is vague if not deceptive in the East Asia context. Therefore, we should turn our focus to the most-mentioned origin of East Asian culture: Confucianism.

### ***Confucianism as a Cultural Basis in East Asia***

East Asia is considered a “Traditional Confucian” culture region for a long period (Jones, 1990) which have been seen as the cultural basis for shaping social norms and political orders (He, 2010). However, despite the ideas of “traditionalism” and “Confucianism” being quite similar and overlapping, their origins are quite different (Lerner, 1958), and their essence includes collectivism, a focus on long-term relationships, and a tendency to avoid conflict (Huntington, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). According to Huang and Chang (2017), the most apparent difference between these two cultural values is that Confucianism has been apart from traditional religions, even religion-free. Even though there are some overlaps between these two values, they are still constructed from a different concept.

Among all the differences, the idea of “structure of grade” may be the most representative of Confucian values. The structure of grade emphasizes that there is a descending order of intrapersonal relationship, and this idea guides people under Confucianism’s influence to respect elders, obey their ruler, and accept the dominance of the authority. From understanding Confucianism as the value system for East Asia, we could find five cardinal relationships embedded in the very idea of structure of grade, and such relationships strongly embrace the traditional mentality of men as breadwinners, and women as caregivers. Such patriarchal concepts pass through generations, influencing the gender division of labor from the public to domestic sphere deeply, hence politics could be regarded mainly as men’s realm. From that point of view, we could predict that women themselves living under its influence will be reluctant to participate in public affairs, leading to creating the gender gap in politics.

### ***Reshaping Dimensions of Asian Traditional Values***

How could we catch the very idea of patriarchy in traditionalism, or “Confucianism,” in East Asia context? To date, there are enormous works dedicated to theorizing and categorizing the essence of several ancient cultures. This article follows Huang and Chang’s (2017) classification scheme, which separates values in Confucianism into four aspects: “collectivism,” “long-term expectation,” “conflict avoidance,” and “Confucian core.” There are mainly three reasons for the adoption of this scheme, firstly, their classification theory mainly based on the observation of Eastern societies, thus it could provide insightful concepts for us to theorize the influence of culture value over political efficacy as we are focusing on East Asian democracies. Secondly, we could utilize each traditional value of these four dimensions separately as they are defined distinctly. Finally, as this definition scheme is constructed and affirmed through Asian Barometer survey data, we could validate our hypotheses by using the same dataset.

Nevertheless, although we have adopted Huang and Chang’s (2017) classification scheme, we do not entirely accept their naming convention and reasoning, especially for the “Confucianism cores” one. Confucian thoughts shaped social norms and the traditional values in East Asia, but the concept of patriarchy in traditionalism is not unique to the East Asia region. For instance, in Catholicism, the power structure among one and their parents/mother-in-law/teacher could be a good projection of power structure between the ruler and the ruled. The more liberal and individualistic atmosphere in US/UK’s educational system/family life/political area is hardly found in France, Germany, or even in East Asia. Moreover, in Islamic societies, the relationships between people and their elders and teachers are highly hierarchical.

To prevent from self-constraint, we borrow Shi’s idea of “orientation to authority” (hereafter: OTA) (Shi, 2014) to replace “Confucianism cores” in Huang and Chang’s work. Therefore, we could use OTA to represent social norms that define how people interact with authorities and powerful figures. Following Shi’s definition, we could distinguish those relationships into “reciprocal” and “deferential” ones. With reciprocal OTA norms, the relationship between citizens and powerful figures is based on each side’s consent, in that one abides by their superior’s judgment because of reciprocal consideration. With deferential

OTA norms, however, subjects have to defer to their superior's decision because of a hierarchical social order. This captures the essence of "one should obey powerful figures because of a hierarchical social order", making OTA a suitable description to the unique traditional culture in the Asian societies. In sum, we are going to differentiate Asians' OTA culture from other dimensions of traditional values, which are: collectivism, long-term expectation, and conflict avoidance.

From the discussion above, we could summarize that the gender gap in political efficacy might result from psychological gender-role perception, which is a side-effect of being stuck with traditional values. Similar to Inglehart and Norris (2003), traditional values could harm gender inequality globally. Nevertheless, we need to modify the operationalization of traditional value of Inglehart and Norris' work in order to accommodate East Asian cultural context, replacing "religiosity" with "East Asia traditional values." From that sense, we deploy Huang and Chang's (2017) concept of "Confucianism core" and make a little modification with Shi's idea of OTA. Hence, our hypotheses are as follows:

**Hypothesis I:** Traditional values have a negative effect on political efficacy.

**Hypothesis II:** OTA value would increase the gender gap of political efficacy more than other traditional values.

In brief, we argue that traditional values influence the socialization process, thus shaping one's value system. Those norms and customs entangled in our society would constrain the empowerment effect of education or political models, making women passively step away from public affairs. Moreover, considering the cultural context of East Asian societies, the value of "deferential orientation toward authority" harming women's political efficacy the most even in modern East Asian democracies.

## **Data and Operationalization**

As discussed above, we treat external political efficacy as our dependent variable and traditional values as independent variables;

socioeconomic status and other individual-level factors are covariates to be controlled. In this article, our data source is the wave 4 Asian Barometer Survey (hereafter: ABS).

By apply ABS data, this study is able to replicate Huang and Chang's (2017) classification scheme and Shi's (2014) idea of Orientation Toward

**Table 1.** DV: External political efficacy

| Question                                                                   | Coding Scheme                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 136 People like me don't have any influence over what the government does. | <i>strongly agree/agree</i> coded as 1, else coded as 0 (Binary) |

**Table 2.** IV and the different dimensions of traditional values

| Variables                | Questions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Coding Scheme                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Orientation to Authority | 60. Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.<br>61. When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.<br>62. Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher. | For each of the traditional values, it coded following the same steps below:<br>1. <i>Strongly agree</i> coded as 2, <i>agree</i> coded as 1, <i>disagree</i> coded as -1, and <i>strongly disagree</i> coded as -2. else coded as 0<br>2. Add up the recoded value from all questions at the same dimension 3. Positive value coded as 1, else coded as 0 (Binary) |
| Conflict Avoidance       | 63. In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group.<br>64. Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict.<br>65. A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Collectivism             | 55. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.<br>56. In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group's collective interest.<br>57. For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed.                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Long-term Expectation    | 58. When dealing with others, developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one's immediate interest.<br>59. When dealing with others, one should not only focus on immediate interest but also plan for future.<br>68. When dealing with others, one should not be preoccupied with temporary gains and losses.                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

Authority for the Asian traditional values. Besides, it also covers different dimensions of traditional values that we could treat as other covariates and comparing their effect on political efficacy with the OTA values. The most important part is, ABS data covers “internal” and “external” efficacy batteries which allowing us to testing our hypotheses and comparing the result with existing literature.

As the ABS core questionnaire contains a standard question of external political efficacy, we could easily use that as the dependent variable by record it as a dummy variable. Simultaneously, we use traditional OTA value as our key explanatory variable and treat other

**Table 3.** Control variables

| Variables                         | Questionnaire / Coding Scheme                                                |                                  |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Demographic Background</i>     |                                                                              |                                  |
| Urban Residence                   | Level (Urban=1, else=0)                                                      | Binary                           |
| Age                               | SE3_2<br>( 1 8 : 2 9 = 1 ;   3 0 : 3 9 = 2 ;<br>40:49=3; 50:59=4; 60+ =5)    | from 1 to 5                      |
| <i>Social Economic Background</i> |                                                                              |                                  |
| Married                           | SE4 (2=1; else=0)                                                            | Binary                           |
| Employed                          | SE9 (1=1; else=0)                                                            | Binary                           |
| income                            | SE14                                                                         | from categories 1 to 5, as dummy |
| Subjective social status          | SE12a                                                                        | from 1 to 5                      |
| Education                         | SE5 (Primary and below=1; Secondary=2 ; University and above=3)              | from 1 to 3                      |
| <i>Religion &amp; Religiosity</i> |                                                                              |                                  |
| Buddhist                          | SE6 (60=1)*SE7                                                               | from 0 to 10                     |
| Catholic & Protestant             | SE6 (10, 20=1)*SE7                                                           | from 0 to 9                      |
| <i>Partisanship &amp; Vote</i>    |                                                                              |                                  |
| Partisanship                      | Q54 (very close=1; somewhatclose=2; just a little close=3; not applicable=0) | from 0 to 3                      |
| Vote for the winning camp         | Q34a (1=1; else=0)                                                           | Binary                           |

traditional values as the control variable in order to capture the very essence of traditional values in citizens' minds more accurately. The details of operationalization of dependent and independent variables are listed as tables 1 and 2.


Regarding the control variables, we include most of the covariates that may affect political efficacy in the existing works, including demographic characteristics, socioeconomic background, religion/religiosity, partisanship, and voting preference as well. The operationalized details of control variables are listed in table 3.

## Empirical Analyses


Starting with the external efficacy, we display relative distribution of men's and women's political efficacy of three selective East Asian democracies. According to figure 2, it shows although men tend to have higher efficacy, the gender differences are marginal in South Korea and Taiwan, but the gender gap is relatively apparent in Japanese society. The remain question is, whether this gap generated by socioeconomic background, educational differences, or cultural influence?

As OTA is the key explanatory variable in this research, we then look into the descriptive information in each county shown in figure 3 that demonstrating the percentage of citizens who have OTA traditional values below. We can see men agree with OTA values more compared to women in all three societies, and this does make sense since social authority is usually held by men in most of contemporary history, besides such values could help them to protect their privilege. However, only approximately 1/10 of women and 1/6 of men agree with OTA values respectively in Japan; in Taiwan, this proportion soars to almost 30% but is distributed more evenly between genders. South Koreans agree the most with OTA value among these three democracies and appeared to shown its significant gender differences, seeming it might related to the Korean-specific social context.

It seems like the descriptive figures are not in line with our arguments because the population with OTA value is the highest within South Korean society than others but did not demonstrate equivalent gender gap of external political efficacy. Nonetheless, the bar charts do



**Figure 2.** Percentage of external political efficacy by gender in three East Asia societies



**Figure 3.** Percentage of citizens having OTA value by gender in three East Asia societies

not tell the real story alone, we then conducted multivariable logistic regression in order to disentangle the relationships while controlling the effects of relevant covariates. Moreover, considering the distinctions of social context, we estimate the model separately instead of pooling observations all together. The results are shown in Table 4 below.

**Table 4.** Regression Models

| Regression Models                 | Japan  |         |        |         | South Korea |         |        |         | Taiwan |         |        |         |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
|                                   | Men    |         | Women  |         | Men         |         | Women  |         | Men    |         | Women  |         |
|                                   | coef.  | signif. | coef.  | signif. | coef.       | signif. | coef.  | signif. | coef.  | signif. | coef.  | signif. |
| <i>Traditional Values</i>         |        |         |        |         |             |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
| OTA                               | 0.46   | 0.26 †  | -1.11  | 0.44*   | -0.16       | 0.20    | -0.56  | 0.21**  | -0.22  | 0.18    | -0.02  | 0.20    |
| Collectivism                      | -0.14  | 0.21    | -0.04  | 0.23    | -0.18       | 0.20    | -0.36  | 0.20†   | 0.10   | 0.18    | -0.35  | 0.18†   |
| Conflict Avoidance                | -0.43  | 0.21*   | -0.79  | 0.23*** | -0.24       | 0.20    | -0.18  | 0.20    | -0.60  | 0.19**  | -0.60  | 0.20**  |
| Long-term Expectation             | 0.25   | 0.37    | -0.83  | 0.31**  | -0.73       | 0.25**  | -0.71  | 0.25**  | -0.08  | 0.36    | 0.17   | 0.37    |
| <i>Demographic Background</i>     |        |         |        |         |             |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
| Urban                             | 0.36   | 0.40    | 0.38   | 0.42    | -0.45       | 0.30    | 0.18   | 0.30    | -0.06  | 0.20    | -0.05  | 0.21    |
| Age group                         | 0.00   | 0.08    | 0.22   | 0.09*   | -0.12       | 0.10    | 0.01   | 0.10    | -0.17  | 0.08*   | 0.11   | 0.09    |
| <i>Social Economic Status</i>     |        |         |        |         |             |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
| Married                           | -0.24  | 0.24    | -0.15  | 0.25    | 0.53        | 0.26*   | 0.33   | 0.25    | 0.05   | 0.21    | -0.28  | 0.20    |
| Employed                          | 0.05   | 0.26    | 0.10   | 0.23    | -0.24       | 0.25    | 0.05   | 0.18    | 0.00   | 0.20    | 0.31   | 0.18 †  |
| income: the fifth quintile        | -0.10  | 0.42    | 0.21   | 0.39    | -1.03       | 0.61 †  | -0.09  | 0.55    | 0.32   | 0.35    | -0.09  | 0.33    |
| income: the fourth quintile       | 0.10   | 0.38    | 0.08   | 0.39    | -1.35       | 0.59*   | -0.34  | 0.55    | 0.10   | 0.32    | -0.12  | 0.31    |
| income: the third quintile        | -0.34  | 0.40    | 0.09   | 0.35    | -1.15       | 0.58*   | -0.62  | 0.52    | 0.67   | 0.34*   | 0.25   | 0.32    |
| income: the second quintile       | 0.26   | 0.36    | -0.08  | 0.38    | -1.09       | 0.58 †  | -0.41  | 0.53    | 0.61   | 0.36 †  | -0.18  | 0.35    |
| income: the first quintile        | 0.12   | 0.35    | -0.13  | 0.35    | -1.01       | 0.63    | -0.16  | 0.57    | 0.45   | 0.37    | -0.18  | 0.40    |
| Subjective social status          | 0.16   | 0.14    | 0.31   | 0.15*   | 0.18        | 0.13    | 0.17   | 0.13    | 0.21   | 0.10*   | 0.18   | 0.11.   |
| Education: secondary              | 0.51   | 0.41    | 0.22   | 0.40    | 0.64        | 0.60    | -0.22  | 0.39    | -0.39  | 0.30    | 0.72   | 0.31*   |
| Education: university and above   | 0.90   | 0.42*   | 0.39   | 0.44    | 0.63        | 0.63    | -0.02  | 0.46    | -0.33  | 0.35    | 1.22   | 0.38**  |
| <i>Religion &amp; Religiosity</i> |        |         |        |         |             |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
| Buddhist                          | -0.03  | 0.04    | 0.05   | 0.04    | -0.04       | 0.04    | 0.05   | 0.04    | 0.01   | 0.03    | -0.02  | 0.03    |
| Catholic & Protestant             | -0.15  | 0.14    | 0.15   | 0.22    | 0.02        | 0.05    | 0.05   | 0.05    | 0.07   | 0.06    | 0.09   | 0.06    |
| <i>Partisanship &amp; Voting</i>  |        |         |        |         |             |         |        |         |        |         |        |         |
| Partisanship                      | 0.40   | 0.11*** | 0.26   | 0.13*   | 0.28        | 0.12    | -0.08  | 0.12    | 0.20   | 0.09*   | 0.22   | 0.10    |
| Vote for the winning camp         | 0.28   | 0.21    | -0.19  | 0.24    | -0.09       | 0.20    | -0.10  | 0.20    | -0.17  | 0.17    | -0.20  | 0.17    |
| Observations                      | 465    |         | 519    |         | 573         |         | 576    |         | 797    |         | 743    |         |
| Missing observations              | 41     |         | 56     |         | 24          |         | 27     |         | 52     |         | 65     |         |
| AIC                               | 675.65 |         | 677.46 |         | 789.03      |         | 787.81 |         | 1014.4 |         | 932.68 |         |

Signif. codes: "†"  $p < 0.1$ , "\*"  $p < 0.05$ , "\*\*\*"  $p < 0.01$ , "\*\*\*\*"  $p < 0.001$

**Table 5.** Focus on the Effects of Traditional Values in three East Asia societies

| <i>Traditional Values</i> | Japan        |                | South Korea   |               | Taiwan        |               |
|---------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                           | Men          | Women          | Men           | Women         | Men           | Women         |
| OTA                       | +†<br>(1.59) | -*<br>(0.33)   |               | -**<br>(0.57) |               |               |
| Collectivism              |              |                |               | -†<br>(0.70)  |               | -†<br>(0.71)  |
| Conflict Avoidance        | -*<br>(0.65) | -***<br>(0.45) |               |               | -**<br>(0.55) | -**<br>(0.55) |
| Long-term Expectation     |              | -**<br>(0.44)  | -**<br>(0.48) | -**<br>(0.49) |               |               |

Signif. codes: “†”  $p < 0.1$ , “\*”  $p < 0.05$ , “\*\*\*”  $p < 0.01$ , “\*\*\*\*”  $p < 0.001$

Note: the values in ( ) are exp(b)

According to the results, we have found some notable differences on a societal and gender basis, but there is one thing in common. In general, all dimensions of traditional values, including the abovementioned OTA, collectivism, conflict avoidance, and long-term expectation, are often negatively correlated to political efficacy, if significantly. We display the odds ratio of each traditional value in table 5 to clarify the effectiveness further. The result from table 5 complies with our Hypothesis I, showing traditional values have negative effects on political efficacy. In addition, different dimensions of traditional values do have an inconsistent effect among these three societies. For example, among Japan and Taiwan societies, the traditional value of conflict avoidance has the most significant impact which not only reduces women’s political efficacy but also men’s. However, in South Korea, long-term expectation is the most effective value instead.

Except for the general argument over traditional values, we put more emphasis on the OTA value through this research. As we notice in tables 4 and 5, the OTA value has a negative effect on Korean women but fails to affect Korean men and Taiwanese people. In contrast, in Japan, there is a significant influence of OTA value on a gender basis. This value significantly inflates men’s political efficacy but hinder women’s. In short, we partially validate our Hypothesis II.

## **Discussion: Traditional Values As Barriers to Women in Politics**

According to the results shown above, we can find traditional values play a role in shaping men's and women's political efficacy in different ways, which may explain some of the gender differences that we have seen in these three East Asian societies. Moreover, we have also demonstrated that traditional values could still prohibit women from public issues even when they are no longer popular.

However, the OTA value only has opposite effects on women and men in Japan, which has the lowest popularity among the three places. The finding seems contrary to the modernization theory as Japan is the most developed country among the selective three and has the longest history of democracy, where empowerment effect of economic and political development should be flourish. We believe there are some distinctive components lie within Japanese culture, but the puzzle must leave for future studies due to space limitations of this research.

There is another pattern deserves our attention in the regression model. In theory, education should empower everyone, but in reality, it has a different effect on political efficacy within these three societies. In South Korea, it did not show any significant effect. In Taiwan, education has a significant positive effect on women but not on men. The most special case is Japan. We have found that higher education reasonably leads to higher political efficacy with Japanese men, but not Japanese women. Namely, education did not work in reducing the gender gap in Japan and consolidated the thought of "leave politics to men" instead.

Apart from cultural values and education, there are plenty of issues regarding political efficacy. After all, political efficacy is part of the complex human attitude and is supposed to be understood in a intricate way. In this study, we demonstrate the single effect of traditional values. However, there should exist an interaction between individual factors, traditional values, and the socialization process. This interaction and its influence on the existing gender political efficacy gap deserve our further attention. Moreover, we hold a discussion on the operationalization of traditional values. As an important factor in shaping gender equality, we should not neglect the fact that culture itself is interwoven in social context. In this article, we apply empirically validated classification to

approach distinct cultural legacy of East Asia region, and we call out one should focus on the richer essence of culture but not downgrade it as merely religion or religiosity.

Cultural values, especially the traditional ones, still influence gender equality in the public sphere nowadays. Only if we face the burden it makes, we can truly be liberated from it and subsequently improve women's political efficacy and participation. To make half of our citizens vital in consolidating the modern democracies, we must know the influence of culture legacies.

## Note

- 1 According to Huang and Chang (2017), the east Asian societies we mentioned here include Chinese societies (Chinese Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan), North-East Asia (Japan, Korea, and Mongolia), and South-East Asia (Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore).

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## 传统价值观与政治效能感的性别差异： 东亚三个社会的比较研究

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**摘要:** 全球政治参与中的性别差异是不争的事实。作为影响政治参与的重要因素，政治效能感可被视为一关键的影响因子，不仅能动员公民社会以提供政体普遍支持，也有助于贪腐防治。从此意义而言，政治效能感是民主巩固的重要关键。然而迄今，尚无系统性的研究关注东亚地区政治效能感的性别差异。本文旨在填补此一研究缺口，并聚焦于三个东亚社会，重新检视 Inglehart 与 Norris 所提出的性别差异之文化解释。本文发现东亚的传统价值会降低女性的政治效能感，但对男性并无相同影响。因此，传统文化至今仍在东亚三社会形塑女性对政治的态度，但其影响多半是负面的。

**关键词:** 传统价值观、政治效能感、性别差异、东亚民主

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## 전통적 가치관과 정치적 효능감의 성별 차이: 동아시아 3개 사회의 비교 연구

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**초록:** 글로벌 정치 참여에서의 성별 차이는 부정할 수 없는 사실이다. 정치 참여에 영향을 미치는 핵심 요인인 정치적 효능감은 시민 사회를 동원하여 체제에 대한 보편적 지지를 제공할 뿐만 아니라, 부패 방지에도 기여하는 중요한 요소로 간주된다. 이러한 의미에서 정치적 효능감은 민주주의 공고화를 위한 핵심적인 열쇠이다. 그러나 지금까지 동아시아 지역의 정치적 효능감에 나타나는 성별 차이에 대한 체계적인 연구는 부족한 실정이다. 본 연구는 이러한 연구상의 공백을 메우기 위해 동아시아 3개 사회에 주목하며, Inglehart와 Norris가 제시한 성별 차이에 대한 문화적 설명을 재검토한다. 실증 분석 결과, 동아시아의 전통적 가치관은 여성의 정치적 효능감을 낮추는 반면, 남성에게는 동일한 영향을 미치지 않는다는 점이 밝혀졌다. 따라서 전통문화는 여전히 동아시아 3개 사회에서 여성의 정치적 태도를 형성하는 중요한 역할을 하고 있으나, 그 영향은 대체로 부정적인 것으로 나타났다.

**주제어:** 전통적 가치관, 정치적 효능감, 성별 차이, 동아시아 민주주의

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## 伝統的価値観と政治的有効感のジェンダー差： 東アジア三社会の比較研究

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**要旨:** 世界の政治参加におけるジェンダー差は、否定しがたい事実である。政治参加に影響を与える重要な要因として、政治的有効感 は市民社会の動員や体制への広範な支持形成において欠かせない要素である。この意味で、政治的有効感 は民主主義の礎となる。しかし、東アジアにおける政治的有効感のジェンダー差を体系的に検討した研究はこれまで存在しなかった。本稿は、東アジアの3社会に焦点を当て、イングルハート(Inglehart)とノリス(Norris)が提唱したジェンダー差に関する文化的説明を再検討することで、この研究上の空白を埋めるものである。分析の結果、伝統的価値観は女性の政治的有効感を低下させる一方で、男性には同様の影響を与えないことが明らかになった。伝統文化は今なお女性の政治的態度を形作る重要な役割を果たしているが、その影響は主に負(ネガティブ)なものである。

**キーワード:** 伝統的価値観、政治的効力感、ジェンダー差、東アジアの民主主義

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